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Introduction
In the early Cold War arena, international pressure on the United States to live according
to its ideological rhetoric enabled the Truman Administration to set a precedent for federal
engagement in domestic civil rights reform. As the United States led the march to institutionalise
human rights as an international standard of moral legitimacy, the country’s grisly record of racial
oppression and violence invited foreign and domestic criticism alike. In a period of intense
political friction in which both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to export their
political and social ideology to the nonaligned Third World,1 Washington’s human rights record
both embarrassed the federal government and interfered with its foreign policy objectives. In
response to these pressures, President Harry S. Truman and his advisors led a campaign for civil
rights based on their strongly held principles of freedom and equality for all. This period in
history fundamentally altered the role of the executive branch in domestic social policy, and
initiated a movement of change that would continue throughout the second half of the twentieth
century.
This paper intends to prove five discrete points. First: Cold War tensions brought
questions of moral legitimacy to the forefront of the national agenda. Second: during the Truman
presidency the country’s moral legitimacy came to depend on its human rights record. Third: due
to their belief in the democratic principles of freedom and equality, President Harry S. Truman
and his advisors at least tacitly supported legal and economic desegregation (though perhaps not
social.) Fourth: foreign pressure on the United States to live according to its ideological rhetoric
gave the Truman Administration the incentive to take action on an issue it was already ostensibly

1

The term ‘Third World’ is used in this paper according to its Cold War definition of non-aligned states, in contrast the ‘First World’ capitalist
nations, and the ‘Second World’ communist countries. Broadly speaking, the term ‘Third World’ included most of Africa, parts of Central and
South America, and much of Asia. Given the strict dichotomy of international politics during this time, the term ‘Third World’ had derogatory
connotations that are in no way intended in this paper. The ‘Third World,’ it also must be noted, is not synonymous with the ‘Developing
World,’ which describes economic development, not political allegiance.
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committed to. Finally, although most of the steps taken towards civil rights during the Truman
presidency were more symbolic than substantive, the administration initiated a federal
engagement with race discrimination that would continue throughout the twentieth century,
ultimately destroying the Jim Crow legal system and similar institutions of racial oppression.
The majority of studies on Cold War civil rights recognise the domestic tensions
associated with the spread of communism, but fail to consider how the institutionalisation of the
principles of human rights—particularly through the United Nations—and the global wave of
racial consciousness played out in the U.S. domestic arena.2 Among those studies that do consider
the international influence on American race relations are those by Mary L. Dudziak and Thomas
Borstelmann. Both of these authors argue that international pressure--often orchestrated by the
Soviet Union--encouraged Truman to embrace social reform at least as a long-term goal.
Dudziak’s article ‘Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative’ also suggests that although the
Truman administration ostensibly supported desegregation, the personal opinions of the president
and other officials differed somewhat from the administration’s public line. In The Cold War and
the Color Line, Thomas Borstelmann agrees that influential government officials had a limited
personal commitment to civil rights, noting that even Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "[t]he
most influential American policy maker 'present at the creation' of the cold war (sic) offered little
enthusiasm for racial equality."3 While this paper agrees that President Truman and many of his
advisors maintained personal prejudices throughout their career, it disagrees about the influence
of these prejudices on their commitment to implementing reform. Truman’s administration made
significant contributions to the civil rights movement between 1945 and 1953, and these steps

2

See William C. Berman, ‘Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,’ in Richard S. Kirkendall (ed.) The Truman Period as a Research Field (Columbia,
MO: University of Missouri Press; 1967) for a full consideration of research that had been done on civil rights during the Truman presidency,
which though outdated references a number of sources of the nature above mentioned.
3
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press; 2001), Page 554
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relied on a moral commitment in addition to pragmatic incentives. Though international and
domestic criticisms of the Jim Crow legal system amid Cold War tensions gave the White House
a realpolitik motive to push for desegregation, Truman’s presidential commitment to the issue
suggests his personal belief in the moral correctness of racial equality, at least within the legal and
economic spheres.
In Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks, Michael R.
Gardner paints Truman as a man with robust moral integrity. Gardner quotes George M. Elsey,
administrative assistant to the president, who described Truman as having an
“outspoken…conviction that all Americans should have equal rights and equal opportunities
under the law.”4 Though Gardner’s representation of President Truman as an idealist willing to
risk his political career to achieve goals he had set for the country may be somewhat embellished,
there is some validity to Gardner’s claim that the president’s personal interest in desegregation
was an act of moral courage. Pragmatism and courage intertwined in the late 1940s and early
1950s to allow a young administration the opportunity and context in which to develop a federally
driven social reform program seeking civil rights for all.
In ‘Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,’ Derrick A. Bell
Jr. argues that the principled argument for racial equality was not enough to drive reform in the
Unites States during the Cold War years. So long as whites believed that racial equality conflicted
with their individual and group interests, Bell argues, they were not prepared to accept any level
of social reform. Bell restricts his study to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, a legal
case in which the Truman Administration was notably active through a Department of Justice
amicus curiae brief. If extended to consider why different levels of reform were and were not

4

George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to President Truman, quoted Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage
and Political Risks (Carbondale, CO: Southern Illinois University Press; 2002), Page x
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acceptable during the Truman presidency, Bell’s theory offers a useful framework of analysis for
both the actions and the rhetoric of the federal government during this period. In order to justify
intervention in domestic civil rights, the federal government needed to paint reform as in the
interests of white America. During the Truman presidency, international condemnation of
domestic race discrimination threatened the nation’s moral legitimacy, providing exactly the
realpolitik incentive necessary for the federal government to highlight civil rights in the national
agenda.
The sheer volume of literature on the U.S. civil rights movement attests to the
attractiveness this topic, but it does not explain why this topic is important. History, the study of
patterns and processes that overlap and occasionally conflict to create dynamic change within
societies, is an ever growing and changing field that benefits from fresh opinions and conjectures.
This paper offers an analysis of a society that resisted change until concepts of moral legitimacy
in the global arena forced it, and eventually its people, to consider where their ideological
commitments lay. This study contributes to the field of civil rights history by arguing that
individual actors during the Truman presidency and global processes combined to instigate a
crucial change within the federal government, and, subsequently, within the fabric of democracy
as it is enacted within the United States.

6

Chapter One

The White American Dream: Moral Legitimacy in the Cold War Arena

In his pledge, on December 29th 1940, of American industrial aid to Great Britain—which
was then under siege by the German Air Force—President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the
American public, “We must be the great arsenal of democracy” in the war against powers
intending “not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the
whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.”5 In
this speech, Roosevelt criticized the expansionist policies of European fascists, and committed the
U.S. to assisting “Democracy's fight against world conquest.”6 Days later, the president reiterated
this sentiment in a message to Congress that described the war as a fight for “Four Freedoms”:
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Roosevelt
described his decision to end American isolationism as impelled by the country’s need to assert
the democratic principles of freedom and equality abroad, a notion that established the tone of
American rhetoric for the remainder of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, however, at home the
Jim Crow system of legal discrimination oppressed some thirteen million U.S. citizens, something
foreign peoples did not fail to ignore as the U.S. advanced a strictly segregated army onto the
European continent.7 The United State’s role in institutionalising human rights globally through
institutions like the United Nations over subsequent years set an international standard of moral

5

Radio Address Delivered by President Roosevelt From Washington, December 29, 1940 [Sourced at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/arsenal.htm on Saturday, April 2nd 2011 at 4:38ECT]
Radio Address Delivered by President Roosevelt From Washington, December 29, 1940 [Sourced at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/arsenal.htm on Saturday, April 2nd 2011 at 4:38ECT]
7
This is an estimate based on U.S. Census Bureau statistics that state that in 1940 there were 12.8 million Black Americans (or 9.8% of the
population), and in 1950 that number had increased to 15 million (10% of the population.)
6
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legitimacy contradictory to the country’s own racial practices, giving domestic and foreign critics
ammunition to discredit the U.S. government on the new world stage.8

Wartime Foreign Critics of American Racism
Throughout the Second World War, the United States stationed a number of GIs in Great
Britain, a country Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Forces, called “devoid of racial consciousness”9 because of the population’s apparent colour
blindness. White American troops attempted to assert the colour line in Britain during the war,
taking particular interest in “protecting” white British women—who they believed did not
understand the importance of racial segregation—from black American soldiers. The British
population, however, rejected white American attempts to assert segregation, and British women
continued regularly engaged in relations with black American soldiers. Judging American troops
by their character, not by their physical appearance, many Britons reported finding “black GIs
more polite and less arrogant than white GIs, and less likely to complain about the relative lack of
American-style comforts.”10 Subsequently, communities often developed closer ties with the
black GIs stationed in their midst. In the small village of Bamber Bridge in Lancashire, for
example, after “the U.S. military authorities had demanded that the pubs impose a colour
bar…landlords had responded with [signs saying] ‘Black Troops Only.’”11 For African-American
soldiers, life in a country where “the colour line was not the custom”12 proved that a society did
not have to be divided by along racial lines as it was at home. “The more I see of England,” wrote
8

The “new” world stage being the United Nations and other such international forums aimed at preserving a collective security and global (or
indeed regional) peace.
9
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press; 2001), Page 34
10
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press; 2001), Page 34
11
Harold Pollins, ‘The Battle of Bamber Bridge,’ BBC History: WW2 People’s War: An Archive of World War Two Memories as sourced at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/85/a3677385.shtml [on Tuesday, 16th November 2010 at 21:09ECT]
12
Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), Page
83
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black Lieutenant Joseph O. Curtis in 1944, “the more disgusted I become with Americans.”13 In
addition to fuelling British criticisms of white American racism, confrontations over what
constituted “appropriate” racial practice in Europe increased tensions across the colour line
between American troops. While the apparent colour-blindness of Europeans inspired black
Americans to seek equal treatment at home, it inspired whites to resort to violent measures in an
attempt to reassert racial dominance.
European interactions with American troops during the war highlighted the apparent
hypocrisy of Roosevelt’s freedom rhetoric, exposing Washington to criticism from Allied and
Axis powers alike. As Lord Malcolm Hailey noted in a 1944 article in The London Times:
There is a growing recognition by the American public that in a conflict which is so
largely a war of ideas, their country occupies a somewhat exposed position as a defender
of the democratic faith. ‘When we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations,’ it has
been said, ‘some of the mocking paradoxes of our own society become so clear that they
can no longer be ignored.’…The position of the Negro…has many features which seem to
be in conflict with that sense of the moral value and dignity of the individual which is a
14
fundamental article of the American creed.

Lord Hailey’s editorial highlights the paradox of the U.S.’s role in a war where the selfproclaimed leader of the democratic faith failed to implement its rhetoric at home. Moreover,
whereas the Allied states discussed U.S. racial practices as a hypocrisy in need of reform, Axis
powers sought primarily to weaken the America’s reputation as leader of the free world. Figure
One,15 a Japanese propaganda image from the war period, depicts the American, British, Chinese,
and Dutch leaders (Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek and a clog to represent the exiled
Dutch leader Gerbrandy) trampling over African Americans, Indians, Southeast Asians, and
Indonesians respectively.16 Illustrations that compared American racism with that of British and

13

Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press; 2001), Page 35
14
Lord Malcolm Hailey, ‘America’s Colour Problem: An Objective Survey of the Negro’s Lot, Contrasts in the North and South,’ The London
Times, Issue 49917, Tuesday, 25th July 1944; Page 5, Column F.
15
Figure One is an untitled image found in the following article: Anthony V. Navarro, ‘A Critical Comparison Between Japanese and American
Propaganda during World War II,’ sourced from https://www.msu.edu/~navarro6/srop.html [on Tuesday, 16th November 2010 at 22:25ECT]
16
Hence the A, B, C, D; the D referring to the Dutch, though that letter is white, unlike the others, and Prime Minister Gerbrandy is not included
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Chinese colonialists offended white
Americans who believed the
democracy promoted equality, not
imperial aggression. For many
African-Americans, however, such
depictions were strikingly accurate,
raising questions among black
soldiers as to why they were fighting
for freedom in Europe when they did
not enjoy basic liberties at home.

Figure One
A Japanese propaganda image disseminated during the Second
World War (exact date unknown.)
The image depicts the “A, B, C, D” American, British, Chinese
and Dutch (an empty clog as the Dutch government was in exile
during the Nazi occupation) leaders Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang
Kai-Shek, and Gerbrandy walking over dark-skinned peoples
symbolising African Americans, Indians, Southeast Asians, and
Indonesians respectively.

The Nazi propaganda machine took the idea of American ideological hypocrisy to an
extreme, as can be seen in Figure Two,17 a 1944 poster disseminated in the Netherlands. Here, the
American “Liberators” are personified as a war machine, adorned in a Ku Klux Klan hood. The
machine’s body is a cage of African Americans, explicitly suggesting that racial persecution is at
the heart of American society. The depiction of a Jewish-American clinging to a moneybag, and
the Star of David between the machine’s legs suggest Jews controlled the wealth and reproduction
of the American war machine, a provocative thought for an anti-Semitic audience, and a perennial
theme in anti-American propaganda. The noose around the machine’s right arm is juxtaposed
with a record in its hand, suggesting the ease with which popular culture and violent assault coexist within American society. The various pageant banners ridicule America’s obsession with
beauty, and the representation of “Miss America” as a Native American furthers the racial irony
of the image. Finally, an onlooker, presumably European, holds a sign in Dutch, which reads, "De

17

‘Liberators,’ a Nazis propaganda poster, 1944, the Netherlands; as reproduced on http://www.oddee.com/item_66536.aspx [sourced on
Thursday, December 2nd 2010 at 12:26ECT]
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USA zullen de Europeesche
Kultuur van den ondergang
redden," meaning “The USA will
save the European culture from
ruin.”18 As anyone vaguely familiar
with the Nazi party will note, this
image does not represent
condemnation of America’s racial
practices on ideological grounds.
This image is powerful not merely
because it presents the United
States as an imperial force, but
because it also exposes the
contradiction between Roosevelt’s
“arsenal of democracy”19 and his
Figure Two
Nazi propaganda image from 1944, disseminated in the Netherlands.

failure to implement that rhetoric at

home.
The U.S. media’s depiction of Nazi anti-Semitism during World War II as inhumane and
distinctly undemocratic also challenged the legitimacy of domestic racial practices. In her article,
‘Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,’ Mary L. Dudziak argues that “In 1944, democracy
was, to many Americans, much more than an abstract idea.” Indeed, “part of the meaning of the

18

Translated for me by a Dutch friend, Laurens Golverdingen, who admitted the archaic language could be translated such that the banner reads
“The USA will save the European culture from ruin,” or “The USA will save the European culture from doom,” although the connotations are
much the same.
19
Radio Address Delivered by President Roosevelt From Washington, December 29, 1940 [Sourced at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/arsenal.htm on Saturday, April 2nd 2011 at 4:38ECT]
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democracy they fought for was its incompatibility with Nazi racism and anti-Semitism.”20 The
threat of Nazi encroachment on American freedom was a prevalent theme
in U.S. wartime propaganda, as can be seen in Figure Three,21 in which American children look
fearfully at the shadow of a swastika falling across their yard. Some Americans identified the
parallels between Nazi anti-Semitism and domestic racial practices, denouncing both as
undemocratic and contrary to Roosevelt’s rhetoric of the American ideal. A New York Times
article from July 1939, for example, quotes John Brophy, the white national director of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, as
saying, "Anti-Semitism, like every other
form of racism and minority hatred, has a
real place in the plans of un-democratic,
un-American forces seeking to dominate
our social and political life."22In
identifying racism (in general terms, not
merely anti-Semitism) as a tool of undemocratic forces, Brophy also identified
the racial practices of the Southern states
as a target for domestic reform.
In the same sentiment, Justice
Frank Murphy of the United States
Supreme Court asserted in 1944 that

Figure Three
U.S. propaganda depicting the threat of Nazi encroachment
as an incentive to promote the war effort by buying was
bonds. Disseminated in 1942.

20

Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (November, 1988), Page 70.
‘Don’t Let That Shadow Touch Them. Buy War Bonds.’ U.S. wartime propaganda poster, designed by Lawrence Beall Smith, 1942, U.S.
Department of Treasury. As reproduced at http://www.nh.gov/nhsl/ww2/ww21prt.html [Sourced on Wednesday, November 24th 2010 at
18:50ECT]
22
‘LIBERTY HELD ENDANGERED: Conspiracy Against Democracy Seen in Anti-Semitism,’ New York Times, July 30th 1939, Page 9
21
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“unless immediate and decisive changes were made in attitude and practices respecting racial
minorities, the American principles of freedom and equality would be dashed hopelessly upon the
rocks of violent persecution and oppression.”23 Like Brophy, Justice Murphy identified the
similarities between racial tensions within the United States and those the war was making
manifest upon the European continent. In Europe, racial intolerance had progressed from random
lynchings to the systematic annihilation of an entire population, and though this seemed a large
difference to some, many Americans undoubtedly identified the line between persecution and
genocide as impossibly thin. To Murphy, the similarities between Nazi and American practices
would entirely discredit the democratic creed if the government failed to implement change.
The Swedish Nobel Laureate, Gunnar Myrdal, wrote a study in 1944 documenting
American race relations, which he called “America’s greatest failure but also America's
incomparably great opportunity for the future.”24 Myrdal argued that in the struggle between
democratic ideals and racial practices in the United States there could only be one winner. In light
of the country’s rhetorical claim to democratic principles, Myrdal noted that “any and all
concessions to Negro rights in this phase of the history of the world will repay the nation many
times, while any and all injustices inflicted upon them could be extremely costly.”25 In other
words, the United States’ moral integrity as a democratic nation required that the government
protect minority groups from racial injustice. As a foreign white critic, Myrdal’s thorough and
impartial analysis of U.S. domestic race relations was vastly influential both to the public and
government in the United States, proven at least in part by the number of copies sold and

23

‘Action to End Anti-Semitism in U.S. Demanded Here by Justice Murphy; Speech at the B'nai B'rith Interfaith Unity Session Warns Nation of
Serious Dangers in Growth of Undemocratic Forces,’ New York Times, May 9th 1944, Page 36
‘American Dilemma,’ Time, Monday, February 7th 1944 [Sourced at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791292,00.html#ixzz1IPL0ecZQ on Saturday, April 2nd 2011 at 6:31ECT]
25
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers; 1996 (1944)),
Page 1015
24
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adaptations printed in the years after its publication.26 Though racism remained a formidable force
in the U.S. at the end of the Second World War, foreign critics began to recognise that federal lip
service to egalitarian ideals was frequently void of practical meaning, and the plethora of media
coverage on the topic propelled domestic civil rights reform to the top of the U.S.’s national and
international agenda.

Polarising Forces and the Rise of Racial Consciousness After the War
African-American participation in World War II, combined with a belief in governmentinitiated social reform as established by Roosevelt’s New Deal, meant that black veterans
returning home in 1945 hoped “to find a new day for democracy.”27 Instead, white southerners
greeted black soldiers with violence, as they attempted to reassert dominance and remind black
Americans that their role in the war had not changed their position within society. Taking the
“lesson” to the extreme, as Thomas Borstelmann notes, “white Southerners unleashed a wave of
intimidation, terror, and death upon African Americans that lasted for much of 1946 and 1947.”28
Violence came in many forms, including riots such as one in Columbia, Tennessee in February
1946, during which the police arrested 100 African Americans, two of whom were “shot and
killed…while under questioning.”29 Newspapers overflowed with reports of race-related
atrocities, such as the story of ex-GI John S. Jones from Minden, Louisiana, who, on August
8th1946 was burnt alive with a blowtorch and then dismembered. In many instances, law
enforcement officers simply looked the other way as whites committed these barbarous crimes;
however, upon occasion, the police themselves perpetrated acts of racial violence. In Batesburg,
26

David W. Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of ‘An American Dilemma 1944-1969’ (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press; 1987), Pages 103-104
27
Steven F. Lawson, ‘Setting the Agenda of the Civil Rights Movement,’ as reproduced in Lawson, To Secure These Rights (Boston, MA:
Bedford/St. Martin’s; 2004), Page 7
28
Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2001), Page 54
29
Steven F. Lawson, ‘Setting the Agenda of the Civil Rights Movement,’ as reproduced in Lawson, To Secure These Rights (Boston, MA:
Bedford/St. Martin’s; 2004), Page 8
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South Carolina, for example, Police Chief Lynwood Shull “gouged out the eyes of uniformed
Army Sergeant Isaac Woodward (and then refus[ed] him medical attention for a day.)”30 This
horrific wave of racial violence was just the latest in a long line of grievances that minority
groups—blacks in particular—held against white rule in the United States.
The inhumanity of each
incident emphasised the longevity
of black oppression, breathing life
into a passionate domestic reform
movement for African-American
rights. Amid the brutality, the
Figure Four
3436 Blots of Shame on the United States: 1889-1922
A map prepared for the NAACP in 1922 and published in
newspapers. The map graphically details the extent and intensity of
lynchings by region and state.

National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) worked fervently to

pressure the government into action, citing research such as that presented in Figure Four,31 which
illustrates the history of lynchings in the United States between 1889 and 1922. Founded in 1909,
the NAACP worked towards their “vision of America as one nation in which all of her citizens
were ensured political, educational, social, and economic equality.”32 They railed against
discrimination and anti-black violence in the South, drawing public attention to the parallels
between domestic race problems and colonialism around the world. Members argued that the
freedom rhetoric initiated under Roosevelt was not representative of life for the thirteen million
black American citizens persecuted under the Jim Crow laws. Moreover, they accused the
30

Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 2001), Page 54
Figure Two, 3436 Blots of Shame on the United States: 1889-1922, was found the National Endowment for the Humanities teaching website
EDSITEment, in a section on the NAACP’s Anti-Lynching Campaign in the 1920s. Sourced at
http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=805 [on Tuesday, 16th November 2010 at 22:46ECT]
32
NAACP Interactive Historical Timeline, speaker Laurence Fishburne Jr., NAACP Website as sourced at http://www.naacphistory.org/#/home
[on Wednesday, 17th November 2010 at 10:16ECT]
31
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government of failing to protect its own people from brutal oppression.33 Unlike other domestic
groups pushing for racial equality, the NAACP’s moderate tone earned it governmental respect,
ensuring the organisation would have a voice in future negotiations. The black press as a whole,
despite varying political opinions, shared a commitment to exposing U.S. domestic race problems
on the international stage.
Following the Second World War, the U.S. did not resort back to isolationism, but instead
took a leading role in the creation of the United Nations, a term coined, not incidentally, by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The United Nations (U.N.) was founded by 51 states in an
attempt to develop relationships among nations that would maintain peace and security, promote
social progress, and improve standards of living around the globe.34 Embodying the American
principles of democracy, peace, freedom, and understanding, the United Nations “served to
institutionalize equal human rights as cultural rules for world society,” and to promote the
principle that “failure to demonstrate adherence to them would undermine a nation’s desires to be
a world leader.”35 As such, the United States’ growing role in the international arena introduced a
new set of considerations onto the domestic policy table. As John D. Skrentny notes, “Before
World War II, the world audience, and particularly the non-European audience, was not a
significant factor in American domestic politics, at least as regarded domestic race relations.”36
All of this changed after the war, however, because Truman inherited a state engaged in global
affairs with a powerful but unenforceable rhetoric that conflicted with existing domestic policy.
Though American notions of freedom and equality inspired populations around the world, it also
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attracted foreign attention—particularly among non-white populations—to a domestic problem,
something African Americans seeking social reform were keen to exploit.
The postwar arena also brought a new strain of policy considerations as tensions
developed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s April
1945 prediction that, “each victor of the war would introduce his own political and social system
as far forward as his own armies could advance,”37 accurately described the steady postwar
erosion of the wartime alliance’s political cohesion. Telegrams from statesmen George Kennan38
and Nikolai Novikov39 to their respective governments regarding the situation of U.S.-Soviet
relations in 1946, cautioned of the expansionist policies of the opposing administration. Kennan,
on the one hand, warned that the Soviet Union, determined that no modus vivendi could exist with
the United States, would seek to weaken the U.S. on both the domestic and international level
until “our traditional way of life be destroyed.”40 Novikov, on the other hand, warned the Kremlin
that there were “Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance,”41 and that
the Soviet Union and its allies were targets for American aggression. These telegrams poignantly
depict the mutual distrust between the two emerging superpowers in the aftermath of the war, a
distrust that dissolved further as both governments took action to contain the influence of the
other in the European continent. From this point onwards, American foreign policymakers put the
containment of communism at the top of their political agenda. Cold Warriors on both sides of the
Atlantic understood the global political alignment as a dichotomy in which a state could only
support one side or the other. In this ‘zero-sum’ game, successful containment policy required
both states to expand their political influence into regions of the world the United States, at least,
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had had little interest in prior to that time. The principle of state sovereignty, another concept
established by the United Nations, meant the superpowers could not gain the political allegiances
they sought by simply storming into the Third World with military force and imposing their
respective ideologies on the populations. As such, propaganda on both sides became the primary
means of discrediting the enemy and advancing their own doctrines abroad. Thus, the
incompatibility of American race discrimination with the cultural rules of human rights
established in the postwar arena became an important theme in the Soviet Union’s propaganda
efforts to paint American leadership as morally illegitimate.
As a communist state, the Soviet Union interpreted and presented American democracy to
Third World nations as an exploitative capitalist system, in which the bourgeois class
(overwhelmingly white) lacked the incentive to correct its oppressive ways. In 1945, the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow even noted that the city’s Foreign Language Institute taught English with a
textbook called 'Stories About Negroes,' which depicted the treacherous conditions American
blacks lived under. This book, therefore, taught English language learners that racism was a basic
facet of American culture. Soviet communists quickly identified blacks as the oppressed “class”
in American society, a group promised equality by the law, but frequently denied the right to vote
due to poll taxes.42An article in Trud, a daily Russian newspaper and the mouthpiece of the Soviet
Labour Unions, in 1946, explained, “The purpose of the unbridled terror directed against the
negroes was to keep the negro masses from participating in the elections.”43 By preventing blacks
from participation in the voting process, Trud argued—in a manner U.S. Embassy officials
considered "representative of the frequent Soviet press comment on the question of Negro
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discrimination in the United States"44—white workers maintained economic and political
domination. The article went on to call “semi-slave forms of oppression and exploitation are the
rule [in the U.S.].”45 The Kremlin’s decision to portray racial savagery as an American norm at a
time when U.S. domestic news sources overflowed with images of Southern racial violence left
the Truman administration vulnerable to criticism from all angles. By November 1946, American
Embassy officials in Moscow noted that “recurring dispatches in Soviet press on this subject [of
racial discrimination in the capitalist world] may portend stronger emphasis on this theme as a
Soviet propaganda weapon."46
The postwar international arena also witnessed a wave of independence movements as
colonial populations sought to fulfil their right to self-determination as established by the United
Nations Charter of June 1945. The principle of self-determination holds that a nation has the right
to determine its own statehood, mode of government and political allegiances, which for
colonially-ruled peoples legitimised a revolutionary end to oppression. As non-white peoples
around the world threw off the shackles of white rule with varying displays of force and dialogue,
the U.S.’s human rights record continued to impair its ability to contain communism around the
globe. As anti-American propaganda spread beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, the Truman
Administration “realized that their ability to sell democracy to the Third World was seriously
hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”47 To the non-white world, evidence of U.S.
domestic racism suggested that the American creed had a “Whites Only” sign on it, an
interpretation the USSR continually reinforced. Though black Americans sought equality not
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independence, self-determination encouraged U.S. civil rights activists to seek a voice in domestic
politics, a voice that called passionately for an end to legalised racism.

Naming and Shaming in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
The international standards of moral legitimacy established by the United Nation made the
institution the perfect forum for American civil rights groups to air their grievances in a global
arena, drawing attention to federal inaction over domestic human rights abuses. Civil rights
groups took their petitions to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), which had been
established in February 1946 to create an international bill of rights, and to investigate accusations
of human rights violations brought forth by governments, non-governmental groups, and human
rights activists. UNCHR internationalized America’s race problems in a way previously
inconceivable, publicly humiliating the Truman Administration by once again highlighting the
validity of Myrdal’s claims in An American Dilemma.
While the State Department had not anticipated domestic actors using the U.N. to discredit
the federal government, officials had considered that the Soviet Union would abuse the forum as a
means to disseminate anti-American propaganda. In November 1947, Dean Rusk of the State
Department’s office of United Nation’s Affairs warned that UNCHR’s Subcommission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities offered the most palpable threat to U.S.
legitimacy on the global stage. “This Subcommission,” Rusk wrote to a fellow State official, “was
established on the initiative of the U.S.S.R., and there is every indication that that country and
others will raise questions concerning our domestic problems in this regard.”48 Given the
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impressive Soviet media coverage of U.S. race discrimination in the late 1940s,49 Rusk’s concerns
were perfectly reasonable, and though it was actually American citizens who engaged the U.N. in
discussions of the “Negro Problem,”50 this only added credibility to Soviet propaganda. Within a
year of the war, black Americans utilised their country’s new and purportedly “moralistic” role
(the result of governmental rhetoric) in the international community as leverage to promote social
reform. In the Cold War context, these actions threatened U.S. prestige, making domestic strife an
impediment to national security. Between 1946 and 1951, three separate American civil rights
organizations—the National Negro Congress (NNC), the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Civil Rights Congress (CRC)—petitioned the
United Nations in protest of continued racial discrimination in the United States. These petitions
are significant not because UNCHR had any power to compel the U.S. government to implement
change, but because they greatly embarrassed the Truman Administration in front of enemy, ally,
and nonaligned states alike. If Truman’s ability to sell democracy to the Third World had not
already been destroyed by the wave of violence reported in the international press, domestic
petitions seeking redress for human rights violations during his presidency certainly raised
questions about the country’s moral legitimacy.
In June 1946, the National Negro Congress presented the first of these petitions to
UNCHR on behalf of black Americans seeking “relief from oppression.”51 As Azza Salama
Layton notes in International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941-1960,
“the National Negro Congress sought five million signatures for its petition and was endorsed by
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an array of organizations” and influential individuals adding appreciably to its credibility.52
According to a contemporary summary of the petition by George Streator of the New York Times,
the NNC requested that the U.N. study the political, economic, and social discrimination
experienced by black populations in the United States, and make recommendations to the federal
government about how to redress the problem.53 The United Nations, however, denied it had the
ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of the United States, and little came of the petition.
While the NNC’s appeal did not add appreciable muscle to the civil rights movement, it
illustrated to the Truman Administration the tenacity with which black Americans sought social
reform. In a meeting with the secretary of UNCHR,54 Dr. Max Yergan, president of the NNC,
criticized the Truman Administration for failing to implement equality as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that it was the NNC’s duty to draw
international attention to human rights violations that the government failed to prevent.
Unfortunately, the petition was largely discredited as communist propaganda because Herbert
Aptheker, an accomplished scholar but a known member of the Communist Party-USA, had
compiled the documentation detailing the specific forms of racial discrimination.55 Nevertheless,
the NNC’s decision to put forward its petition in the United Nations, the new forum for
international affairs, highlighted the “American Dilemma” in international politics, ensuring
global news coverage of the “Negro Problem” that embarrassed the Truman administration, even
if it had little tangible effect of the position of minority groups within the country.
Anti-Western pressure groups around the world reported the NNC’s petition as evidence
of the illegitimacy of American dominance in the new world arena. In Iraq, for example, the
52
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petition was publicised by Al Istiklal, the Independence Party, which staunchly opposed British
colonialism and had already begun to talk of the U.S. in neo-colonial terms because of its role in
bolstering colonial governments throughout the region.56 At that time, U.S. Middle Eastern policy
focused on maintaining colonialism “to protect Western interests and expunge communism,”57
and Arab nationalists, unsurprisingly, resented the superpower’s support of these oppressive
regimes. As such, many Arab states were extremely receptive to the anti-American propaganda
that was frequently disseminated by communist sources. According to James S. Moose Jr.,
Charge d’Affaires ad interim at the American Embassy in Baghdad, Al Istiklal’s newspaper, Al
Yaqdha, was, “probably the most vociferous and most spleenful of several ardent anti-British
nationalist papers which have sprung up recently.”58 U.S. domestic race relations fuelled
accusations of rhetorical hypocrisy by those (like black Americans) to whom the hands of
freedom and democracy had not yet been extended. In June 1946, Al Yaqdha declared:
Thirteen million American negroes have appealed to the United Nations Organization to save them
from the persecution which they are suffering at the hand of America which is treating them cruelly
and robbing them of all the rights enjoyed by American citizens. Yet the Statue of Liberty still
59
stands in America and the Americans do not feel ashamed!

Such emphatic criticisms of U.S. hypocrisy echoed throughout the Third World, but what made Al
Yaqdha’s comments particularly poignant was its interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in relation
to this hypocrisy. The U.S.’s movement into the global arena,60 according to Al Yaqdha, proved
that the country sought to “usurp the rights of the small nations,”61 and in doing so it would assert
its racial practices abroad. The common themes between this anti-American propaganda, and that
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from communist, or even simply pro-civil rights sources, focused domestic attention on the
political alignment of reform activist. As the red scare began and certain U.S. committee and
senators adopted aggressive tactics to expunge communist infiltration, only staunchly prodemocratic or anti-communist rhetoric conferred legitimacy on civil rights groups, which
cyclically only furthered Soviet criticisms of U.S. hypocrisy.
In October 1947, the NAACP’s W.E.B. DuBois, a world-renowned civil rights activist,
prepared what Thomas Borstelmann has called the most “scholarly and impressive”62 of the three
petitions to the United Nations seeking redress for racial inequality in the United States. DuBois
called on “the nations of the world to persuade this nation to be just to its own people.”63The
NAACP’s An Appeal to the World received expansive domestic and international media coverage
due to its comparative objectivity, sparking outrage around the globe.64 This petition had more
success than its predecessor because unlike the NNC, charges that the NAACP was a front for
communist infiltration were only made by Southern white segregationists and never stuck.
DuBois was able to engage international discourse on the issue of U.S. race relations by
highlighting his governmental hypocrisy, and his pro-democratic stance at the time65 lent
legitimacy to his arguments. Charles H. Martin notes that the black press revered the NAACP in
the late 1940s for its dedication to racial equality. “The Atlanta Daily World,” for example,
“commended the NAACP for directing ‘the world’s attention to a miserable failure of democracy
here in the United States.’”66 Martin also notes that mainstream American media equivocated on
the issue, showing concern both for the moral wellbeing of the United States, and the damage that
62
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highlighting domestic problems had on the nation’s reputation abroad. Saul Padover, columnist
for Picture Magazine “willingly conceded that racial inequality was the country’s most pressing
domestic problem, but he cautioned that such accusations ‘will embarrass the United States before
world opinion and will, in all probability, be used as ammunition by the Russians.’”67 Though the
American press was divided over the value of the NAACP’s actions, most writers conceded that
on an international level, domestic race issues were fast becoming a liability.
Months before the NAACP met with members of UNCHR to present their petition,
President Truman had stated before a joint session of Congress his belief that “it must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by
armed minorities or by outside pressures.”68 This speech, on March 12th 1947, initiated a policy
known as the ‘Truman Doctrine,’ which guaranteed U.S. support to people fighting “terror and
oppression”69around the world. With thirteen million U.S. citizens70 living under the oppression
of the Jim Crow legal system, however, the NAACP poignantly asserted that Truman’s Doctrine
represented nothing more than an unenforced rhetoric for many Americans, and called for reform.
Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union, which correctly understood the Truman Doctrine as
America’s attempt to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in Europe, “championed the
NAACP petition in the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities.”71 As such, while the Soviet Union capitalised on domestic unrest within the United
States, American civil rights activists capitalised on international tensions in the hope of shaming
the government into enacting social reform.
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The institutionalisation of human rights on the international level, particularly through the
formation of the United Nations, set a standard of moral legitimacy in the postwar years that stood
in stark contradiction to the United States’ domestic racial practices. As the Cold War brewed, the
Soviet Union attempted to exploit this contradiction to discredit the United States on the global
stage. Domestic civil rights activists also tried to disseminate information about U.S. race
discrimination abroad in the hope that embarrassment in the international arena would encourage
federal reform at home. This two-sided attack on U.S. moral legitimacy threatened the country’s
ability to spread the democratic message to non-white peoples who were actively throwing off the
shackles of colonial white rule in much of the Third World. As such, Cold War politics brought
the Truman Administration face-to-face with the “American Dilemma.” Only those branches of
government directly engaged with foreign affairs, however, would factor the country’s
international reputation into domestic policy construction, creating an unbridled divide between
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government.
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Chapter Two

Breaking the Taboo: Federal Engagement with U.S. Civil Rights Reform

Foreign attacks on the United States’ moral legitimacy in the late 1940s and early 1950s
threatened President Harry S. Truman’s role as leader of the free world, and provided new
incentives for federal engagement in reforms to which the executive branch was already
ideologically committed. Truman, like his predecessor, and in spite of inherited prejudices,
believed in the morally correctness of desegregation. Unfortunately, such convictions were not
enough to motivate change in a country where leaders relied on public approval to earn and retain
office, and throughout this period domestic opinion was too divided over civil rights to make it a
priority issue.72 Foreign criticism during the initial Cold War years, however, tipped the balance
on an issue dividing the country, bringing reform to the top of the nation’s agenda as an issue not
just of prestige, but also of national security. Proof that international criticism led to this federal
change is evident in the fact that only specific parts of the American state, namely, “those [parts]
engaged with the world audience”73 showed a commitment to civil rights reform. This limitation
reflects the validity of Bell’s ‘Interest-Convergence Dilemma,’ which suggests in a realist tone
that dominant groups only take action on social issues when they perceive said action to be in
their interests.74 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, only those branches of government that came
into direct contact with foreign critics—and therefore were forced to realise the damage domestic
72
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race discrimination had on the nation’s ability to implement foreign policy—promoted federal
engagement in domestic race relations. Notably, the biggest push for reform during this era came
from the Department of State, which was explicitly concerned with foreign affairs, and the
Executive Branch, which shaped foreign policy. By contrast, Congress, the national legislative
body, which focused primarily on domestic politics and had little contact with foreign critics,
actively resisted civil rights reform. As distinguished black historian John Hope Franklin noted in
a 1968 address, “The crucial turning point in viewing the problem of race as a national problem
occurred when the executive branch of the federal government began actively to assume a major
role.”75

The Department of State: Difficulties with the Empty Vessel
In its dealings abroad in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Department of State
experienced difficulties affecting its policy objectives abroad as a result of foreign preoccupation
with domestic race discrimination. The frustrations and failures of State Department officials to
convey the U.S. government’s ideological commitments to audiences critical of domestic
practices filled thousands of reports flooding the department from U.S. Embassies around the
world. On May 8th 1946, the acting secretary of state, Dean Acheson, summarised these
difficulties in a letter to the Fair Employment Practices Commission:76
The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an adverse
effect upon our relations with other countries. We are reminded over and over by some foreign
newspapers and spokesmen, that our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired.
While sometimes these pronouncements are exaggerated and unjustified, they all too frequently
point with accuracy to some forms of discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national
origin. Frequently we find it next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in
other countries; the gap between the things we stand for in principle and the facts of a particular
situation may be too wide to be bridged. An atmosphere of suspicion and resentment in a country
75
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over the way a minority is being treated in the United States is a formidable obstacle to the
development of mutual understanding and trust between the two countries. We will have better
international relations when these reasons for suspicion and resentment have been removed.
I think that it is quite obvious…that the existence of discrimination against minority
groups in the United States is the handicap in our relations with other countries. The Department of
State, therefore, has good reasons to hope for the continued and increased effectiveness of public
77
and private efforts to do away with these discriminations.

Numerous civil rights advocates, the President’s Commission on Civil Rights, and the Justice
Department all cited Acheson’s letter in subsequent years as evidence that desegregation and
social reform were integral to the country’s interests abroad. Perhaps the most illuminating aspect
of the State Department memorandums recording foreign criticism of the “Negro problem” during
this time is geographical and political diversity among them. Most State officials noted the
political persuasions of the publication they cited, and criticisms from pro-American sources,
especially in allied countries, received particular attention because they threatened to further
damage the U.S.’s image in with otherwise friendly states. To show the consistent and cumulative
pressure on Truman throughout his presidency to redress civil rights inequalities, it is beneficial to
briefly suspend the chronological order of this study. Despite the steps the administration took
towards social reform during Truman’s presidency (discussed at length in chapter three), foreign
disapproval of U.S. race practices did not subside, in fact it continued to grow exponentially,
particularly in the nonaligned Third World.
In the postwar arena, the U.S.’s burgeoning interest in central Europe came at the expense
of damaged relations with its more traditional South American allies, particularly as it reallocated foreign aid away from the region.78 The price of this for U.S. prestige was significant, as
it lent anti-American and communist sympathisers credibility. Like in the Soviet Union, these
77
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forces readily exploited U.S. racial practice to persuade audiences that the U.S. espoused an
empty rhetoric of freedom and equality. As Stanley E. Hilton notes in ‘The United States, Brazil,
and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship,’ this was particularly true in
Brazil. The Correio de Manhã, a daily Brazilian newspaper, published criticisms of U.S. racism
on multiple occasions, stating in February 1947:
The refusal of the vote to negroes which seems to be taking place in the Southern states is one of
the paradoxical ways in which the United States, one of the most democratic nations of the earth,
strongly reveals itself as racist. The world will not believe such in the clamorous preachings (sic) in
favor of 'respect for the human being' as long as this indispensable respect is not everywhere
inherent to the person and is determined by the color of his skin.79

In one left-leaning Brazilian magazine, Diretrizes, writer Gondin de Fonseca ridiculed the empty
vessel of American rhetoric in light of domestic human rights violations saying, “This happens in
the United States, a nation which aims at teaching democracy to the world. Ha ha!”80 As
democracy grew unsteadily in Brazil in the post-war years, the damage that American ideological
hypocrisy had on the ex-colony’s domestic affairs, particularly as U.S. aid bolstered imperial
powers in Europe, heightened frustrations and armed anti-American fractions.
Even in countries closely allied with the United States, such as Greece, a recipient of early
European reconstruction aid, pro-American writers did not shy away from criticising the U.S.’s
domestic racial practices. Mrs. Helen Vlachos wrote a series of articles for Kathimerini, a daily
Athenian newspaper, in July 1948, about her experiences in the United States, calling racial
prejudice and discrimination America’s “Achilles heel.”81According to K.L. Rankin, the Charge
d'Affaires ad interim of the American Embassy in Athens, “the series, which is written from the
human interest angle, has been well disposed with respect to the American people and their
institutions and in harmony with the basically friendly attitude the author has always shown
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toward the United States. Her comments in the two pieces under report should therefore be
regarded, not as a result of anti-American bias, but as the author's frank reaction to what she
regards as a deplorable situation.”82 As with the many other dispatches sent to the Department of
State from foreign embassy officials, Rankin discussed at length the political motivations of the
piece, noting that Mrs. Vlachos’ moderate tone meant that her message would carry to a larger
audience. “Mrs. Vlachos' writings,” he noted, “are being widely read and discussed by educated
Athenians, the overwhelming majority of whom share her feelings in the matter.”83 While
communist propaganda exaggerated racial tensions in the U.S., even more moderate reports in
friendly nations gave Soviet and other anti-American propaganda credence, hampering the State
Department’s ability to carry out foreign policy objectives.
U.S. race relations also tarnished America’s allies as they sought to defend the democratic
creed from Soviet attack. Robert Coe, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in the Hague, the
Netherlands, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Acheson in February 1950 recounting a meeting
with a Dutch official:
…the Netherlands is very unreceptive to anti-American propaganda, whether it emanates from
Communist sources or from right-wing colonial die-hards. However, he added that the opponents of
American policies possess one propaganda theme which is extremely effective throughout Europe
and even more effective in Asia—criticisms of American racial attitudes…the American point of
view towards negroes and other minority groups was extremely difficult for friends of America to
explain, let alone defend...in his opinion, the actual situation is sufficiently bad to provide a very
84
solid foundation for the fabulous structure of lies which the Communists have built up.

In short, during the Cold War, American allies promoting democracy struggled to defend
American rhetoric in the face of the country’s grisly human rights record, making it difficult to
contain the spread of communism, particularly in non-white Third World nations. Additionally,
criticisms of white America’s unfair treatment of minority populations coming from European
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imperial powers were simply embarrassing. Indeed, Dutch minister Robert Coe pointed out that in
comparison to U.S. practices, “the Dutch attitude towards Indonesia seemed almost enlightened”
because “While the Dutch had often demonstrated a stubborn colonial mentality, they have rarely
emphasized the racial factor per se.”85 The international community was unusually united in its
condemnation of U.S. racial practices, such that nations otherwise directly opposed to one another
(like colonial and colonised populations) joined forces in a campaign to make the leader of the
free world live up to its rhetorical commitments to equality for all.
The similarities drawn between U.S. racial practices and Nazi atrocities during the Second
World War heightened foreign sensitivity to the civil rights status of persons of colour in the
United States. In response to the wave of violence spreading throughout the South in 1946, the
Manchester Guardian, for example, reported to a British labour audience, “In a number of
southern states the [Ku Klux] Klan is once more active and shows its strength by the openness of
many of its activities…They are against Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and Communists, their
doctrines obviously paralleling those of Hitler in many respects.”86 The perceived similarities
between U.S. and Nazi racial practices sparked a determined vilification of American racial
practices in the British press, not least because U.S. courts permitted, or at least rarely prosecuted
perpetrators of, racial violence. When two fourteen year old black boys, Charles Truesdale and
James Adam, were sentenced to death in Jackson, Mississippi, for example, press reports of the
court decision "motivated a number of protests to the [U.S. London] Embassy."87 In addition, as
three British Members of Parliament wrote a telegram, on January 14th 1946, directly to the White
House, stating “Respectfully urge you protect basic human rights by intervening prevent
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execution Negro boys in state of Mississippi.”88 Such determined actions by the public and
Parliament alike in the United Kingdom, one of the United States’ closest Cold War allies, forced
the State Department to confront the long-term damage domestic inaction on civil rights would
have on the country’s position in the international arena.
Colonial powers and ex-colonised nations were unusually united in their criticisms of
American racial practices, which indicated the gusto with which the newly entrenched standards
of moral legitimacy influenced a nation’s standing in the global arena. While criticisms from
European allies were embarrassing, media coverage of the issue in newly independent and
predominantly non-white states severely impaired the U.S.’s ability to form alliances essential to
its Cold War strategy. Perhaps the most striking way U.S. racial practices leached into the foreign
media was when non-white foreign dignitaries on diplomatic missions experienced racial
discrimination on American soil. White Americans, accustomed to treating persons of colour as
second-class citizens, did not recognise the elevated status of non-white foreign visitors, and often
treated them with the same abrasive disregard as they did American blacks. Few foreign officials
anticipated the high level of prejudice they experienced in the U.S. (not least, in the nation’s
capital), and they returned home deeply offended by their American reception. These incidents
exposed American notions of freedom and equality as an “empty vessel” to the free world; a
principle that the U.S. readily espoused, but took no responsibility for enacting.
In her article ‘Civil Rights as a Cold War Imperative,’ Mary L. Dudziak discusses the
reception of Haitian Secretary of Agriculture Francois Georges at a 1947 conference in Biloxi,
Mississippi.89 After accepting an invitation from the National Association of Commissioners,
Secretaries and Directors of Agriculture, Secretary Georges arrived in Biloxi in November 1947
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only to be told that “for ‘reasons of color’ he would not be able to stay in the hotel with others
attending the conference.”90 To add insult to injury, the hotel manager also informed the Haitian
diplomat that during the day he would have to eat meals separately from the other guests and
officials at the conference. The socialist newspaper, La Nation, reported that "the ardent defenders
of American democracy now have before their eyes the brutal fact of what this democracy
is…Can a civilised people call the treatment of which our Minister has been a victim other than
barbaric; can serious people still speak of American democracy?"91 While one U.S.-friendly
Haitian newspaper, Le Nouvelliste, stated that the sort of racial prejudice Georges experienced
was the result of “stupid insolence” in the South and did not reflect the situation of race relations
throughout the country, it also noted that racial prejudice represented a "hideous disgusting fact
that constitutes shame for any country as civilized as the United States."92 Unsurprisingly,
Secretary Georges left the United States early and the Haitian ambassador lodged a formal
complaint with U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, predicting consequences for the
international democratic coalition should the U.S. Government continue to permit American
nationals to treat foreign officials so unjustly. Secretary Francois Georges wrote in his complaint
to Marshall:
The Haitian Government notes with regret that the treatment just received by one of the members of
its Cabinet in the territory of the United States does not well accord with the policy of sympathy
which it has been unceasingly developing to mark clearly that the world is one. Considering the
unfavourable repercussion produced on opinion by incidents of this kind, the Haitian Government
would be disposed to decline all invitation to congresses and conferences which are to take place in
States where its delegates would be exposed to slights not to be endured by the representatives of a
93
sovereign and friendly country.
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Such frank admonishments of U.S. domestic racial practices not only embarrassed the Truman
administration, but also fuelled criticism of American foreign policy, for why should a country
intervene abroad when it could not keep its own house in order? To Secretary of State George C.
Marshall, author of the economic strategy to rebuild Europe in the wake of the Second World
War, the repercussions of this incident were not lost. Months earlier, in July 1947, Marshall had
written that "the foreign policy of a nation that does not want to rely upon possible military
aggression depends on the moral influence which that nation exerts throughout the world,”
adding, “The moral influence of the United States is weakened to the extent that the civil rights
proclaimed by our Constitution are not fully confirmed in actual practice.”94 Marshall encouraged
President Truman to take action to defend the democratic alliance by supporting civil rights at
home, adding another strong diplomatic voice to the growing number of government officials
advocating for social reform.
Even the smallest articles in domestic media illustrating race discrimination had a
damaging effect on foreign relations, as anti-American critics scoured the pages of U.S.
newspapers and magazines. On August 25th 1952, for example, Time magazine published a short
piece entitled ‘Foreign Relations: How Not to Make Friends’ documenting the experiences of
Thava Rajah, one of Malaysia’ top labour leaders, during a U.S.-sponsored trip to Washington,
DC. Among the several businesses that refused to serve Rajah during his visit, one was, according
to Time, actually in the same building as the State Department’s Office of International
Information, which sponsored his visit to the American capital.95 Time noted that Rajah was “not
necessarily unfriendly, but he was vastly puzzled”96 after being turned away from several stores
and restaurants on account of his colour. In one restaurant the manager had explained to Rajah
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and the two men he was sitting with (a Burmese judge and a Malayan university lecturer) that he
could not serve them because it was against the law. Time quoted Rajah as saying, “After all, isn’t
white a color? I am terribly surprised by all this. You people talk democracy, and you must be
careful to practice what you preach.”97 As Susannah Hufstader noted in ‘Anti-Communism and
Time Magazine, 1949-1953,’ Time was widely read throughout the early Cold War, and it “made
a significant impact on public perceptions of Communism, both as a threat on the international
stage and in the domestic arena.”98 Time did not only influence American readers, however, it
also reached audiences on the other side of the world. After reading Time’s 45-line piece on
Thava Rajah’s experiences with racial discrimination in Washington, D.C., Lee Moke Sang, the
Secretary of the Federation of Government Administrative and Clerical Unions in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia took action. Three days after Time printed its article, the American Consulate staff in
Malaysia faced questions to which they had no answer. Sang informed the Consulate:
Incidents reported in TIME MAGAZINE regarding racial discrimination suffered by Thava Rajah
and his colleagues who are touring U.S. of America on leader specialists grants given by your
Department have greatly shocked members of my Executive Council. As Thava Rajah represents
Johore Postal Employees Union on our Executive Council incidents as reported are bound to cause
very unfavourable reactions among our unions especially at a time when U.S. of America is looked
upon as champion in cause of freedom and justice. I am directed therefore to request explanation of
reported incidents so that position can be made known to our delegates at our forthcoming annual
99
conference on August 30, 1952. Yours faithfully Lee Moke Sang.

The U.S. con consulate official handling the situation, a Mr. Vanoss,100 seemed personally
embarrassed over both the accusations, which were damaging for the consulate’s relationship with
an important Malaysian organization, and by his lack of information about the incident happened.
In his memorandum to the Secretary of State, Vanoss wrote:
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I have replied stating that any embarrassment suffered by Thava Rajah or any other
Malayan while in U.S. under leadership grand would be a matter of utmost concern and deep regret
to Consulate and to U.S. Government. However, we have no information other than reference
TIME MAGAZINE article we cannot comment further and have transmitted letter to Department
requesting full report of facts.
Accordingly, I would appreciate full facts known to Department together with
101
Department’s comment.

State Department officials posted overseas not only faced the impossible task of explaining U.S.
domestic race relations to often less-than receptive audiences, but they also had to defend the
democratic creed as a principle that embraced freedom and equality in the face of obvious
violations of that principle within the United States. When incidents like those involving Thava
Rajah in Washington D.C. embarrassed the country, State Department officials were on the front
line, waiting to be attacked and then meekly apologise for “any embarrassment suffered.”102 The
U.S. Government’s “deep regret”103 over such instances did little to temper the anger and
frustration of foreign critics, and the hollowness of such language in the face of continued
discrimination at home only gave credence to anti-American and communist claims that “semislave forms of oppression and exploitation are the rule” in the United States.

Truman: A Man of Principle and Pragmatism
President Harry S. Truman, though ideologically committed to desegregation and equality
before the law, held personal prejudices that limited his ability to promote absolute racial
equality. Nevertheless, his moral beliefs, when combined with realpolitik foreign pressure, led
President Truman to promote civil rights reform and take quantifiable steps towards enacting
equality. As Alonzo L. Hamby poignantly notes in Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman
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was “torn between tolerance and tradition in race relations.”104 Born in Lamar, Missouri, in 1884
to a farm family who had owned a number of slaves prior to the Civil War, in Truman’s
experiences childhood racism was established as a norm. Michael Gardner, however, argues,
“Despite the racist culture that permeated Missouri in the post-Civil War environment of his
youth, Truman evolved into a man who was not put off by a person’s lesser economic status or
skin color.”105 While a pleasant fiction, Gardner’s interpretation of Truman is far too simplistic. A
more qualified analysis shows that Truman was ideologically committed to the principle of
equality, his political action on racial issues must be understood as provoked by a combination of
personal convictions and realpolitik pressures.
As president, Truman did not shy away from civil rights reform as his predecessor,
President Roosevelt, had done. Early in his career, when he was judge in Jackson County,
Missouri, Truman contemplated joining the Ku Klux Klan because of the organisation’s political
power in the region; however, when a Klan officer asked the young judge to take a pledge not to
hire any Catholics or Jews, he refused, demanding repayment of his $10 membership fee.106
Truman’s experiences fighting alongside Irish Catholics during the First World War had taught
him the importance of overcoming ethnic differences, and a subsequent distaste for inequality,
which continued to inform his political career.107 Back in 1940, during his re-election campaign
for senator, Truman had made a speech in Sedalia, Missouri, saying, “I believe in the Constitution
and the Declaration of Independence. In giving the Negroes the rights which are theirs we are
only acting in accordance with our own ideals of a true democracy.”108 Truman’s decision as
president to take a stand on racial discrimination is therefore reflective of a deeper understanding
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of justice, not merely as a response to real world pressures. Though Truman’s belief in civil rights
reform suggests that he possessed a degree of racial tolerance atypical of his Southern brethren,
his occasional use of derogatory language towards minority groups indicates that his tolerance
was limited by personal prejudice. For example, in 2003 the National Archives discovered a lost
diary entry from July 1947 in which Truman expressed strong anti-Semitism. “The Jews, I find,”
he wrote, “are very, very selfish…when they have power, physical, financial or political neither
Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment to the under dog.”109 Without
excusing the obviously anti-Semitic language of this quotation, it is worth nothing that Truman
goes on to qualify his accusations by broadening his argument, stating, “Put an underdog on top
and it makes no difference whether his name is Russian, Jewish, Negro, Management, Labor,
Mormon, Baptist he goes haywire. I've found very, very few who remember their past condition
when prosperity comes.”110 This qualification does not remove the racism from Truman’s words,
however, and the stark contradiction between this personal note and his public rhetoric regarding
Jewish immigrants and the State of Israel is striking. "By the standards of later generations,”
Thomas Borstelmann argues, and despite Truman’s presidential commitment to civil rights, the
president “remained a ‘racist’ in his personal attitudes.”111 Remembering this fact in a discussion
of the man’s motives for civil rights reform does not discredit his actions; it simply puts them
more appropriately in context. The late William Safire, speechwriter for President Richard Nixon
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and later a New York Times columnist, criticised historians for making excuses for the racist
language of individuals otherwise remembered for anti-segregation policies.112 Safire argued that
actions do not nullify words, and that both are integral to a discussion of character. As such, while
it is appropriate to hail Truman’s presidential commitment to civil rights, one must not ignore his
personal prejudices, nor the limits they placed on his ability to execute reform. Truman, notably,
pushed for economic and political equality, ideas established as American values in the
Declaration of Independence; however, he did not put social equality on the White House’s
political agenda,113 and he continued to refer to racial minorities in derogatory terms throughout
his lifetime.
Acknowledging that Truman had personal prejudices does not discredit the moral
motivation that the president, as a statesman on the international stage, felt for seeking civil rights
reform. American freedom rhetoric as espoused by Truman, and Roosevelt before him, did not
qualify the democratic creed as a “white only” ambition, and thus this rhetoric can be interpreted
as at least a tacit support of domestic legal equality as well as an international equality. President
Roosevelt’s belief in this ideal had notably fewer de facto results than Truman’s, an issue raised
in an oral history interview of black civil rights advocate federal Justice William Hastie, Jr., in
1972. Hastie, notably, was the highest ranking African-American judge during the Truman
presidency, having been nominated to office by Truman himself in 1946. When asked how
Truman’s views on civil rights matters compared with those of President Roosevelt, Hastie
replied:
I am sure that President Roosevelt was sincerely concerned [about civil rights], both to better the
condition of the American Negro and to alleviate discrimination and segregation, but I think there is
112
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no doubt that President Roosevelt had made a calculated determination that in foreign affairs, in the
prosecution of the war, he considered it crucial to hold the support of the southern Democratic
leadership, including the most reactionary and prejudiced of that leadership; and that he was,
himself, going to take no action that would so alienate that part of the Party and the congressional
leadership that he would jeopardize essential support from foreign affairs and other domestic
affairs. So the result of that was that Roosevelt would move only very cautiously, almost
marginally, in this whole area.
Truman was an entirely different sort of person. I think one of the many remarkable things about
him was that though he had been brought up and his public career back in Missouri had developed
in machine politics, he was a person who had very firm convictions, and when he reduced an issue
in his own mind to a position that, "This is right; and that is wrong," he would not allow political
114
considerations to cause him to disavow the position that he regarded as morally wrong.

Justice Hastie painted Truman here as having greater convictions and fewer restraints—be they
personal or political—than President Roosevelt, making him a more active proponent of civil
rights. Firstly, Hastie’s assertion that World War II prevented Roosevelt from promoting the
cause of civil rights ignores the six years FDR had been president prior to the war. As racial
prejudice has a long history within the United States, civil rights clearly had been an issue for
minority groups before to the Second World War, and thus it must be concluded that Roosevelt’s
inaction came from the reality that domestic reform was not on white America’s political agenda
at that time. As Mary L. Dudziak argues, the war changed this for some American whites (if not
FDR himself) because “part of the meaning of the democracy [soldiers] fought for was its
incompatibility with Nazi racism and anti-Semitism.”115 In an eloquent display of this sentiment,
Aubrey B. Sally, a white World War II veteran and recipient of both the Purple Heart and the
Distinguished Service Cross, wrote to President Truman in September 1950, stating, “Segregation
is not one of the things I fought for in the last war. In fact, in principle it was one of the things I
was most explicitly fighting against.”116 World War II brought racial inequality into the limelight
and invigorated the domestic and international push for social change. Hastie’s argument that
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Roosevelt could not afford domestic disunity during war may be legitimate; however, the fact
remains that Roosevelt, despite a personal belief in the democratic principle of equality, did have
the opportunity to institute civil rights reform before the war, but lacked a significant political
motive to do so.
Hastie’s second key point is that Harry S. Truman was a determined man with “very firm
convictions.”117 Though his personal prejudices inhibited him from seeking social equality, he
worked to secure the legal and economic rights of racial minorities, and set a precedent for federal
engagement in civil rights reform. Justice Hastie recognised the limitations of Truman’s civil
rights commitment in his oral history in answer to the following question from Jerry N. Hess, the
interviewer:
HESS: Just a general question, at this time, just what should President Truman or the Truman
administration have done that it did not do to advance the position of the Negro? Did he try hard
enough? Did Mr. Truman try hard enough? Should he have appointed more blacks to high office?
HASTIE: Well, certainly in comparison with what Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did, the
number of blacks appointed to high office was relatively small. I suppose that breaking a taboo has
a significance in itself, and it's hard to compare that with the quantitatively larger things that were
done after this taboo was broken. In that sense, I think my appointment to this bench twenty-two
years ago, had a value and importance, perhaps greater than the appointment of several Negroes
later. Truman was very much concerned, of course, with what, at that time, was of particular
concern to the Negro, and a great irritant, and that was the segregation policies in the Armed
Forces. And there he moved very positively and effectively. So, I think my answer would be, "He,
like I think everyone else, could really do more than he does," in this and so many other things.
And yet, his accomplishments in the field of race relations and the treatment of the Negro by the
Government were in my view precedent-making; they paved the way for, and made very much
118
easier the things that the President that succeeded him did.

Truman’s contribution to civil rights, according to Hastie, lies in the precedent he set for federal
engagement with the issue. In “breaking a taboo,”119 Truman initiated change by symbolically
flagging race discrimination as something that stood in staunch contradiction with American
democratic principles. The act that caused him to raised this flag, notably, occurred on September
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19th 1946 when Walter White, the executive secretary of the NAACP, men personally with
Truman and recounted the racial violence white Southerners were inflicting on towards African
Americans. According to White, “Truman became pale, and his voice trembled as he promised
action.”120 In a telegram the following day to Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Truman mentioned
the torture of Sergeant Isaac Woodward by Police Chief Shull, saying:
I am very much alarmed at the increased racial feeling all over the country and I am
wondering if it wouldn’t be well to appoint a commission to analyze the situation and have
a remedy to present to the next Congress...
…I know you have been looking into the Tennessee and Georgia lynchings, and also been
investigating the one in Louisiana, but I think it is going to take something more than the
handling of each individual case after it happens—it is going to require the inauguration of
121
some sort of policy to prevent such happenings.

This quotation indicates Truman’s understanding that increased racial violence was, through
important, just an extension of racial discrimination occurring throughout the United States. In
ordering a holistic assessment of the civil rights status minority groups, Truman demonstrated his
conviction that inequality threatened American national interests. It is important here to note that
in private communications, the president explained his incentive to study the status of civil rights
as moral, not political. This tone would undergo change as Truman brought his commitment to
reform into the public sphere, suggesting his rhetoric reflected not just his personal convictions,
but a political decision to make civil rights palatable to the American public.

Governments Are Instituted Among Men
On December 5th 1946, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9808, creating
the first Presidential Civil Rights Committee (PCCR)122 in American history, building a vehicle
for federal civil rights reform. The president authorised PCCR “to inquire and determine whether
120
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and in what respect current law enforcement measures…may be strengthened and improved to
safe-guard the civil rights of the people.”123 In ordering all federal agencies and departments to
cooperate with the committee’s investigation, Truman affirmed the importance of racial equality
for the future of American unity, an idea largely ignored since Abraham Lincoln’s reconstruction.
The creation of a civil rights committee established a presidential, and thus federal, commitment
to redressing race discrimination, signifying to the public the “need to extend equality under the
law.”124 Capitalising on foreign disapproval of racial violence, Truman exercised his right to
executive action, forcing “a very reluctant and largely segregated federal government to assume
its rightful leadership role on civil rights.”125 By establishing PCCR through an executive order,
Truman satisfied civil rights activists, and cleverly avoided confrontation with white southern
Democrats in the senate, temporarily isolating the issue from party politics.126
In his selection of committee members, Truman continued his attempt to walk the middle
ground on civil rights reform, yet he still managed to express his desire for change. With the
assistance of White House aides David K. Niles and Philleo Nash, Truman selected a racially,
politically, economically, and gender diverse committee of “prominent Americans who would be
sympathetic to civil rights.”127 Many members of the committee worked for organisations with
departments or partnerships abroad, and thus personally appreciated the damage international
criticism of America’s domestic practices had on the country’s image overseas. As Walter White
noted, “the makeup of the committee was intentionally broad based so that [its] findings would
enjoy maximum credibility outside of the more narrow and largely regionally based civil rights
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movement.”128 Each member of the board brought an astute awareness of the implications of
racial discrimination in their various field, lending their report credibility even among audiences
not predisposed to support civil rights reform.129
PCCR derived the report’s title, To Secure These Rights (TSTR),130 from a phrase in the
Declaration of Independence, which states: “…to secure these rights governments are instituted
among men.”131 This thoughtful title established the committee’s opinion that civil rights reform
required governmental action. As Charles W. Shull noted in his 1948 review, TSTR “is an
expression of an ideal and it is also a political document phrased on the level of policy to be
fixed."132 The authors of TSTR appraised the tenets of U.S. rhetoric in an attempt to the
government policy accountable to the principles it so willing espoused. PCCR briefly noted the
country’s achievements towards equality thus far, stating, "But our purpose is not to praise our
country's progress. We believe its impressive achievements must be used as a stimulus to further
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progress, rather than as an excuse for complacency."133 In writing To Secure These Rights, PCCR
recognised, as Truman had done, that the recent surge of violence in the South reflected deeper
problems within the country, and hoped reform would "cure the disease as well as treat its
symptoms."134 Taking a holistic approach to an investigation of civil rights afforded PCCR the
opportunity to establish a blueprint for civil rights reform within the United States, an imperative,
by 1947, for reasserting nation’s moral legitimacy on the world stage.
PCCR identified moral, economic, and international incentives for reform. “The pervasive
gap between our aims and what we actually do,” the committee noted, “is creating a kind of moral
dry rot which eats away at the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs.”135
Economically, PCCR argued that segregation, particularly of the labour force, was inefficient
because it inhibited perfect competition in the market, thus lowering gross national product and
the standard of living for all citizens. Internationally, PCCR asserted, racial discrimination
hindered American foreign policy, particularly as “Those with competing philosophies [meaning
communists and fascists] have stressed—and are shamelessly distorting—our shortcomings.”136
In the context of the rapidly brewing Cold War, domestic race discrimination hindered America’s
ability to export democracy because many people understood “the treatment which our Negroes
receive…as a reflection of our attitudes toward all dark-skinned peoples.”137 With these
ideological and pragmatic incentives for reform, PCCR proposed an agenda more aggressive than
the president had hoped given the domestic divide over the issue, particularly within the
Democratic Party.
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In recognising the oppressive potential of a democratic majority (which in the U.S. meant
whites), PCCR emphasised the need for governmental intervention to protect its citizens’
“essential rights,” categorised as: (1) The Right to Safety and Security of the Person; (2) The
Right to Citizenship and its Privileges; (3) The Right to Freedom of Conscience and Expression;
and, (4) The Right to Equality of Opportunity. In each of these categories PCCR detailed
violations of minority rights, and sought to redress institutionalised racism. Moreover, in each of
these categories PCCR recognised the implication of domestic race discrimination on the nation’s
reputation in the global arena.
The first category of rights discussed in TSTR was the ‘Right to Safety and Security of the
Person,’ meaning protection “against bondage, lawless violence, and arbitrary arrest and
punishment.”138 Truman notes in his Memoirs that he felt driven to take action on racial
discrimination in 1946 “because of the repeated anti-minority incidents immediately after the war
in which homes were invaded, property was destroyed, and a number of innocent lives were
taken.”139 Violence made discrimination visible to the outside world, and foreign media portrayed
Truman’s failure to protect American citizens from racial brutality as a failure of democracy.
PCCR noted the psychological consequences of these legal failings, stating, “every time lynchers
go unpunished…Negroes have learned to expect other forms of violence at the hands of private
citizens or public officials.”140 Discrimination before the law perpetuated violence throughout
America, and left the democratic system exposed to accusations of hypocrisy by communists and
fascists that were keen to exploit American weaknesses.
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The second category in TSTR was the ‘Right to Citizenship and its Privileges.’
Citizenship in the U.S. was granted by birth, so as the U.S. Constitution only guaranteed rights to
American citizens, PCCR assessed the process of naturalisation for alien residents, noting that,
“the standards of eligibility in our naturalization laws have nothing to do with a person’s fitness to
become a citizen. These standards are based solely on race and national origin, and penalize some
residents who may otherwise have all the attributes necessary for American citizenship.”141 As
such, a person’s race restricted their access to constitutional rights, and legal discrimination
disproportionately affected some minority populations.142 PCCR highlighted the immorality of
this policy by discussing the death of a Japanese American who had bequeathed his land to his
parents in his will. As neither of his parents had been born in the U.S., and they had not been
eligible for naturalisation, they were not legally allowed to inherit their son’s property, despite the
fact they had actually bought it for him years beforehand.143 The government’s failure to protect
the legal rights of minority groups suggested, according to PCCR, that the U.S. did not consider
the rights set forth in the U.N. Charter universal. Legalised race discrimination also affected the
residents of Guam and American Samoa, because the U.S. gave them the status of ‘U.S. national,’
but did not grant them citizenship, so they could not participate in the political process. Violations
of the U.N. Charter that American diplomats had been instrumental in creating not only
discredited the country’s rhetoric, but also had de facto implications for the validity of the United
Nations itself.
Even minorities that held U.S. citizenship often found that whites had the means to
prevent their participation in the political process. Although universal suffrage existed
141
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theoretically in the United States, segregationists had constructed various barriers to stop blacks
from voting, and “as legal devices for disfranchising the Negro have been held unconstitutional,
new methods ha[d] been improvised to take their place.”144 From simple intimidation tactics to
white-only primaries (which stopped blacks electing party candidates), segregationists had found
inventive ways to restrict black voters despite the Fifteenth Amendment. Many states enforced a
poll tax, which actually prevented poor whites from voting as well, but disproportionately
affected racial minorities because of limited employment opportunities. As Figure Five145 clearly
illustrates, poll taxes significantly reduced
the voting pool, further inhibiting the
democratic process. As U.S. governmental
rhetoric suggested the inherent equality of
democracy, domestic practices facilitated a
majority rule, legally oppressing minority
populations. Thus, in the Cold War context,
the leader of the “free” world and the
spokesmen for the democratic ideal
maintained only partial democracy on its
own soil.
A final element of the right to
citizenship that the report highlighted as
inadequately protected by the government

Figure Five
PCCR’s diagram depicting the effects of poll taxes on the
Southern electorate. 1947.
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was the right to bear arms. PCCR stated, “Prejudice in any area is an ugly, undemocratic
phenomenon; in the armed services, where all men run the risk of death, it is particularly
repugnant.”146 PCCR examined institutional and private discrimination within the armed services,
noting that in spite of rhetoric from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard advocating
colour-blindness, the services segregated their troops, rarely commissioned minority soldiers, and
did nothing to prevent discrimination among the ranks. Despite their efforts for their country,
black military personnel often experienced maltreatment and abuse by both the civil authorities
and the general public while in uniform. Fighting a war against racist fascism with a segregated
army epitomised the duplicity of U.S. freedom rhetoric for Americans and foreigners alike. That
the U.S. government could force its citizens to fight for their country, but could not protect them
from the subsequent violence demonstrated an absurd and grotesque hypocrisy in American
democratic practice.
The third “essential right” PCCR investigated was the ‘Right to Freedom of Conscience
and Expression,’ which as freedom of worship, speech, press and assembly, were rights PCCR
considered “relatively secure.”147 At the time of the investigation, PCCR determined that the most
immediate threat to freedom of expression was indirect, stemming “from efforts to deal with those
few people in our midst who would destroy democracy.”148 This section of the report discussed
the rights of Communists and Fascists, calling “special limitations on the rights of these people to
speak and assemble”149 unconstitutional. Noting that the U.S. attempted to assert freedom of
speech as a tenet of the democratic ideal abroad, PCCR condemned “red hunting” as
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undemocratic, thereby reiterating Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ doctrine of ‘clear and present
danger,’ which permits all expression except that which incites violence among listeners.
Discussion of this third right illustrates that PCCR was not solely concerned with racial practices,
but sought to project a universal concern regarding individual rights. Allowing freedom of
expression for all groups was an important tenet of the democratic ideal, and PCCR argued that
failure to implement it would expose the country to accusations of fascist oppression from its
democratic peers.
The fourth and final “essential right” considered in the report was the ‘Right to Equality of
Opportunity’, which incorporated the right to political participation, social services, employment,
housing, recreation, et cetera. In its discussion of job discrimination, PCCR cited a witness before
a congressional committee, who explained:
Discrimination in employment damages lives, both the bodies and the minds, of those
discriminated against and those who discriminate. It blights and perverts that healthy
ambition to improve one’s standard of living which we like to say is peculiarly American.
150
It generates insecurity, fear, resentment, division and tension in our society.

This quotation illustrates the psychological implications of employment discrimination, which
perpetuated racial tensions within society, increasing disunity. Economically, employment
discrimination inhibits perfect competition because it prevents a segment of the population from
participating as producers and consumers, due to income, restricts specialisation, and stifles
ingenuity. Discrimination in the public school system, particularly southern segregation,
perpetuated the economic divide between majority and minority groups by limiting a child’s
potential. Combined, inequality of opportunity in many areas perpetuated the cycle of racially
aligned poverty in the United States. PCCR noted that the ‘separate but equal’ policy of southern
states rarely provided equal facilities for minority groups. Moreover, segregation had
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psychological implications because “it brand[ed] the Negro with the mark of inferiority and
assert[ed] that he [was] not fit to associate with white people.”151 Segregation as a principle
created divisions and tensions among groups that anti-American actors could easily exploit. As
such, PCCR established
desegregation and equality as an
issue of both national security and
social reform.
PCCR highlighted the
failure of the U.S. government to
uphold its principles of freedom
and equality for minority groups in
a discussion of civil rights in the
nation’s capital, a city that “should
symbolize to our citizens and to the
people of all countries our great
tradition of civil liberties.”152
Instead of a beacon for American
freedom, Washington D.C., as
shown in Figure Six,153 exhibited
Figure Six
PCCR’s illustration of racial inequality in Washington D.C.,
highlighting transportation, housing, education, and healthcare.
1947.
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discrimination and inequality denounced by domestic and foreign media. The authors of To
Secure These Rights called Washington D.C. “a graphic illustration of a failure of democracy,”154
advocating not just for reform, but also for government-initiated reform.
Importantly, PCCR cited President Truman’s advocacy of a federal role in civil rights
reform. In his June 1947 speech at an NAACP rally, Truman had said, “We must make the
Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities of all
Americans…Our National Government must show the way.”155 PCCR agreed with Truman’s
assessment that the government ought to lead social reform, justifying this in very explicit terms.
PCCR asserted that many states had been either unable or unwilling to eliminate civil rights
violations on their own, and therefore needed government help. PCCR also argued that, “it is a
sound policy to use the idealism and prestige of our whole people to check the wayward
tendencies of a part of them.”156 This assertion highlighted the importance of moral integrity to
the American ideal, noting that upholding equality was essential to maintaining both unity within
the country and legitimacy abroad. Perhaps most importantly, the U.S.’s civil rights record had
“growing international implications,”157 because failure to uphold democracy and freedom at
home exposed the U.S. to vehement criticism abroad, particularly in discussions of human rights
at the United Nations. Though PCCR said the government should be concerned about this
criticism, they also argued that foreign media attention was only dangerous to America’s
reputation if the government failed to respond to it. The federal government had established itself
as an instrument of reform during the new deal, and as such the population now looked to Truman
154
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to continue in Roosevelt’s footsteps. Finally, PCCR argued, “there is much in the field of civil
rights that [the Federal Government] is squarely responsible for in its own direct dealings with
millions of persons.”158 As the largest national labour employer, racial discrimination within
Federal agencies and departments as well as in the military hampered equality in the country as a
whole. Thus, in reforming its own internal policies, the Federal Government had a unique
opportunity to lead reform nationwide, and cleanse the country’s reputation abroad. In all, PCCR
made a strong set of arguments for federal government intervention in civil rights, which put
pressure on the president to take action.
Responding to the extensive and varied civil rights abuses identified in its investigation,
PCCR suggested a comprehensive governmental reform program under six general headings, with
thirty-five specific recommendations. First, PCCR proposed strengthening government machinery
to better enforce federal policy and create more equality before the law. These measures would
expand the government’s ability to effect change on American soil, signifying to the outer world
that Truman was prepared to enact reform in-keeping with his ideological rhetoric. Second, PCCR
proposed government legislation to address racial violence, such an anti-lynching act and a
criminal statute on involuntary servitude. With these recommendations, PCCR hoped the
government would clearly delineate the law on personal security, both to aid the justice system,
and establish American rhetoric (of racial prejudice as un-democratic) within the law. Third,
PCCR proposed the government terminate poll taxes, enact a statute of voter protection, institute
universal suffrage in New Mexico and Arizona (where Indian citizens could not vote), abolish
racial requirements for naturalisation, repeal legal discrimination against ineligible aliens, and
grant citizenship to the people of Guam and American Samoa. PCCR believed these measures, if
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enacted, would secure U.S. citizens and residents their political rights, thereby removing an
important tenet of foreign criticism. Fourth, PCCR proposed that the government require all
groups that sought to influence the public to register, and establish loyalty obligations for federal
employees. PCCR considered these measures sufficient to inhibit communist or fascist infiltration
without restricting the rights of those groups to free speech. Fifth, PCCR proposed that the
government eliminate all forms of segregation in American life, and enact legislation to ensure
fair employment, education, housing, and equal access to national and state facilities. This, the
most dramatic set of recommendations in TSTR, was written with the hope the federal
government would bring an end to the Jim Crow legal system and the international criticism it
attracted. Finally, PCCR proposed the government rally the American people to support civil
rights reform, initiating a long-term public education campaign. Combined, these six sets of
recommendations159 represented a complete upheaval of American social life, firmly establishing
the principle of equality within the law. Importantly, each set of proposals incorporated changes
that would help improve American relations with foreign states and establish the Truman
Administration as a strong force of equality on the domestic and international stage.
The moment Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights placed its 178-page report in the
president’s hands on October 29th 1947, “civil rights moved to the forefront of the liberal reform
agenda.”160To Secure These Rights staunchly asserted that civil rights reform was essential to the
moral, economic, and international well being of the country, and dared the president to take
action. Black civilians, veterans, labour leaders, and white liberals all hailed the report’s
progressive tone, advocating for immediate policy in the manner suggested by PCCR. In the
South, however, “the leaders of ‘white supremacy’ began at once their campaign of demagoguery
159
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to attempt to nullify [Truman’s] efforts to develop federal safeguards against racial
discrimination.”161 The tenacity of the report overwhelmed the president. As Alonzo L. Hamby
notes in his book Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman, “Truman faced a dilemma. The
report was stronger than he had expected, yet he had portrayed the committee as sound and had
promised action. He now had to respond to this aggressive agenda while trying to hold Southern
Democrats behind him.”162
When asked about the efficacy of To Secure These Rights in an interview in 1977, Philleo
Nash, Special Assistant in the White House Office during the Truman Presidency, stated, “I
would like to point out that the whole country’s attitude on civil rights and on majority-minority
group relations was turned around by the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.”163 The report
illustrated the idea that by the mid-1940s the establishment of racial equality in the United States
was integral to both domestic unity, and to the success of U.S. foreign policy. A wide spectrum of
the population—including liberals seeking social reform and State Department experts concerned
with national security—called on the Truman administration to take a stand against race
discrimination. No longer able to take the middle ground, Truman chose not to protect the
Democratic coalition, but to take action to defend the country’s reputation in the global arena. In
February 1948, Truman took PCCR’s recommendations to Congress, illustrating, even though his
bill was not passed, that the federal government was willing to be the force of change on civil
rights. Though the Congress did not establish PCCR’s recommendations in law until the mid1960s, President Truman initiated a process of reform that created a “tremendous awakening of
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the American conscience on the great issues of civil rights,”164 and the wheels of change gained
momentum.

Civil Rights in Presidential Rhetoric After To Secure These Rights
In American Civil Rights Policy from Truman to Clinton,165 Steven Shull argues that
although presidential communications regarding “emotionally charged” policy areas such as civil
rights “may be more symbolic than substantive,”166 they still have an important function.
Presidential communications focus public attention on issues the president considers important,
which encourages debate and ultimately enables the White House to gather support for policy
preferences prior to setting detailed policy agendas. After receiving the report compiled by the
President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR), public communications released by the White
House emphasised the importance of social reform on foreign relations. On January 7th 1948, in
his State of the Union address, for example, Harry S. Truman asserted, “Whether discrimination
is based on race, or creed, or color, or land of origin, it is utterly contrary to the American ideals
of democracy.”167 Symbolically, this was a message to the international community as much as
the domestic population; a message in which the President of the United States branded racism as
both undemocratic and ‘un-American.’ This is the speech in which Truman called on Congress to
authorise the European recovery program, a program to fund development, contain communism,
and provide a “moral stimulus to the entire world.”168 In committing the federal government to
driving reform in such an internationally orientated speech, the president emphasised the
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significance of civil rights reform to this “moral stimulus” package. “Above all else,” he said, “we
are striving to achieve a concord among the peoples of the world based upon the dignity of the
individual and the brotherhood of man.”169 While this speech did nothing substantive for civil
rights, symbolically it drew a parallel between the country’s international aims and a domestic
issue. In relating race discrimination to an inability to effect world peace, the president
emphasised the damage domestic civil rights had on the democratic creed, and initiated debate on
a topic set to appear on the White House’s policy agenda.
Less than a month later, President Truman presented a special message to Congress on
civil rights, which in its opening sentiments emphasized the international incentive for social
reform. “The founders of the United States,” he said, “proclaimed to the world the American
belief that all men are created equal…these ideals inspired the peoples of other lands, and their
practical fulfilment made the United States the hope of the oppressed everywhere.”170 The
President went on to note that the ideals of liberty and equality had not been completely realised,
and never would be “so long as any American suffers discrimination as a result of his race, or
religion, or color, or the land of origin of his forefathers.”171 For the United States to maintain its
position as the “hope of the oppressed everywhere,” Truman argued, the democratic ideal had to
be realised. For the democratic ideal to be realised, racial discrimination had to be abolished. For
racial discrimination to be abolished, the federal government had to take action. Truman
reasserted the claims of PCCR in stating that, “The protection of civil rights is the duty of every
government which derives its powers from the consent of the people.”172 This sentiment is
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particularly compelling given the President’s audience, Congress, who individually derived their
power from votes, and upon whom he placed the burden civil rights legislation. Truman’s
concluding sentiment was also international:
If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore
hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we wish to fulfil the promise that is ours,
we must correct the remaining imperfections in out practice of democracy.
We know the way. We need only the will.

173

The President did not choose to end this instructive message to Congress calling for reform on
moral grounds, instead he chose to highlight the international consequences of failing to “correct”
the situation. Put simply, Truman did not make a moral claim about civil rights; he just assumed
one. Thus, the White House’s action to redress domestic race discrimination were inspired by
concepts of moral correctness, but motivated by the international implications of failing to live up
to the promises of the American creed.
Truman’s decision not to make a public moral argument for civil rights also has a
pragmatic message: namely, the President and his speechwriters did not believe that principled
reform arguments would be compelling to large segments of the American population. Those
members that saw reform as a morally correct action probably already backed Truman’s rhetorical
crusade, and thus these were not the targets of his speeches. The impact of domestic race relations
on international affairs was Truman’s realist argument for reform, one that did not require him to
insult large segments of the Democratic Party by calling their beliefs “immoral.”

International pressure in the Cold War arena for the U.S. to live according to its
ideological rhetoric came from both communist and non-communist sources, bridged the divide
between the colonial and colonised world. The unprecedented unity with which the international
173
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community collectively condemned U.S. domestic race discrimination underscored the
significance of civil rights reform to American moral legitimacy, and subsequently the country’s
efficacy on the global stage. The federal government, committed to the democratic principle of
equality since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, had lacked either the moral leadership or
the realpolitik motivation to expand that principle to include minority populations before the
inauguration of Harry S. Truman at the end of an international war against racial prejudice. The
polarised Cold War international climate exacerbated domestic racial tensions and brought U.S.
human rights violations to the attention of peoples around the world. Foreign media coverage of
U.S. race practices impaired the country’s ability to sell democracy to the nonaligned Third
World, making civil rights reform an issue of national security. President Truman’s decision to
create a committee to investigate the civil rights status of minority populations in late 1946,
though a response to the wave of violence spreading through Southern states, suggested a
presidential commitment to redressing domestic discriminatory practices. The President’s
Committee on Civil Rights produced a provocative report that advocated for a strong federal
commitment to reform given the ineffective and differing state commitments to the issue. PCCR
said this action was essential because discriminatory practices were fundamentally un-American,
and damaging to both the national economy and the country’s reputation in the global arena. As
the president grappled with incorporating the contents of PCCR’s report into his political rhetoric
without ostracising Southern white voters, he also began ordering and approving measures that
would make de facto changes in American society.
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Chapter Three

Literal Actions from Literary Abstractions: Federal Attempts to Promote
de facto Reform in American Society

The Truman administration’s active role in civil rights reform during the late 1940s and
early 1950s was a response to the growing significance of international condemnation of the
country’s racial practices in the polarised Cold War arena. Though it is important to recognise the
increased domestic pressure for federal action on civil rights immediately preceding the 1948
presidential election, the American public was too divided over the issue to be the primary force
driving social reform. The reality that steps taken to improve the welfare of minority populations
in the United States were made only by branches of government directly influenced by foreign
pressure, while actively resisted by Congress, the national legislative body, exhibits the
international nature of these reforms. The most significant steps taken towards eradicating racial
inequality during Truman’s presidency came from the Department of State, the president himself,
and the Department of Justice. Though Truman’s civil rights initiatives were more symbolic than
substantive, he gave momentum to a reform movement that would continue throughout the
second half of the twentieth century, eventually realising every single policy objective set down
by the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 1947.
President Truman’s rhetorical commitment to civil rights reform alienated large segments
of the Democratic Party, particularly members in the South, where segregation remained an
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important tenet of both the social and legal system.174 Conservative Democrats opposed to
Truman’s civil rights rhetoric tried to convince him to change his 1948 electoral message, but the
president held strong to his ideological convictions. “I’m not asking for social equality,” he wrote
on August 18th 1948 to friend Ernest W. Roberts, a proponent of segregation, “because no such
thing exists, but I am asking for equality of opportunity for all human beings and, as long as I stay
here, I am going to continue that fight.”175 Any scholar of Truman’s civil rights policy will note
that most of the steps the president took towards reform occurred in the months leading up to the
national election. Considerations of domestic policy are not without merit, particularly as black
northern voters became an important pressure; however, traditional histories of Truman’s
motivations have been too quick to call the president’s actions election tactics.176 Under immense
foreign pressure to take action on U.S. race discrimination, the federal government’s decisive
steps in 1948 reflect the global nature of a domestic issue, not least because the American
population was too divided over civil rights to be the primary force pushing for change.
The oft-cited Gallup poll from March 1948, which asked fifteen hundred U.S. citizens
whether they supported a congressional enactment of Truman’s entire civil rights programme,
was not as indicative of Truman’s imprudent moral courage as some authors have claimed.177
Michael Gardner, for example, states in Harry S. Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and
Political Risks that 82 percent of those surveyed in March 1948 opposed congressional enactment
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of Truman’s civil rights programme.178 The two Gallup polls that posed this question in March
1948, however—#414K and #414T, having 1511 and 1529 respondents respectively—show
vastly different results from those Gardner cites. In Poll #414K, only 19.46 percent of respondents
said congress should not pass Truman’s civil rights programme as a whole; and in Poll #414T,
that number was 20.8
Figure Seven

percent.179 As can be seen in

Results of a Gallup poll conducted in March 1948.
Question: qn10c [the same for both polls]
(Have you heard or read about the “Civil-Rights” program recently
suggested by President Truman?) [IF YES, ASK:] How do you feel about
Truman’s civil-rights program? Do you think Congress should or should
not pass the program, as a whole?
Field Date: 03/05/1948-03/10-1948 [same for both]
Sample Size: 1511 for #414K; and 1529 for #414T

Should
Should no
No opinion
Not necessary, it's in the U.S.
Constitution
Might work in North, dangerous in South
Should, if it's constitutional
Anti-lynch law should be passed
Negro segregation in travelling
Depends what it includes, some okay
Miscellaneous
No code or no data

Poll #414K
%
No.
22.77 344
19.46 294
19.52 295

Poll #414T
%
No.
21.91 335
20.80 318
22.69 347

0.66
0.00
0.00
0.20
0.07
0.26
0.20
36.86

0.72
0.13
0.13
0.07
0.00
0.13
0.26
33.16

10
0
0
3
1
4
3
557

11
2
2
1
0
2
4
507

Figure Seven, the vast
majority of respondents (over
30% in both instances) did
not answer the question
because, presumably, they
had not yet heard of
Truman’s civil rights
programme.180 Withal, in
both instances more people
supported a complete
congressional enactment of

Truman’s civil rights programme than the number who opposed it, and still more supported
partial implementation of the programme. According to the Gallup Brain record of its polls,
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interviewers have only asked this question on three occasions in the organisation’s history, the
two instances cited above in March 1948, and once in November of that same year.181 Where
Gardner got his statistic that 82 percent of respondents opposed congressional enactment
therefore, remains uncertain;182 and a 20 percent opposition does not indicate that civil rights
reform carried the level of political risk Gardner argues it did. What these results do suggest is
that civil rights was a contentious issue during an important election year, one that required
Truman to exercise caution in order to prevent offending large segments of his constituency.
Governmental action on civil rights in 1948—which included an amicus curiae brief in a key civil
rights case, and a pair of executive orders to desegregate the military and prohibit race
discrimination in the civil service— did not reflect the sort of caution one might expect from a
president facing a difficult election. After all, Gardner is correct that white Southern Democrats
were at least as important an interest group as Northern blacks in the mid-twentieth century (and
probably more so.) The decision to take action on civil rights in an unpredictable domestic arena,
therefore, suggests that the Truman Administration was responding to a different incentive,
which, upon examination, proves international in nature.

Prejudice and Property: A Shifting Government Role in the Supreme Court
One of the most impressive displays of federal engagement in civil rights reform during
the Truman presidency was the Justice Department’s involvement in legal cases where issues of
race discrimination, particularly segregation, were at stake. Facing a conservative Congress, and
keen to enact change unabated by party politics, the Truman’s Justice Department filed several
181
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amicus curiae briefs to promote civil rights reform through the Supreme Court. Prior to 1948, the
Justice Department had only participated in civil rights cases “when the litigation involved a
federal agency, and when the question in the case concerned was the supremacy of federal
law.”183 Following the President’s Committee on Civil Rights’ 1947 report, however, the Justice
Department started participating in cases in which it was not a party. Philip Elman, a lawyer in the
Solicitor General’s office from 1946 to 1960, explained in an oral history interview, that this
change was inspired by the “strong position urging an end to racial discrimination”184 PCCR
espoused in To Secure These Rights. At the time of the committee’s report, several cases
involving purported civil rights violations were pending in the Supreme Court, leading Elman and
Phineas Indritz, a lawyer at the Department of the Interior, to initiate a governmental intervention
in keeping with PCCR’s recommendations. The two lawyers successfully convinced the
Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the NAACP, the ACLU, the American
Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish Committee to write letters to the president and the
Attorney General outlining their concern over the status of civil rights in the U.S. and suggested
the staff “write letters to the President and the Attorney General urging the government to
intervene in the Supreme Court.”185 Elman, who sat at the unofficial civil rights desk in the
Solicitor General’s office,186 then collated these messages into a formal memorandum to the
Attorney General recommending that the United States file an amicus curiae brief in the first
among these cases, Shelley v. Kraemer. Following executive approval, this brief would set a
precedent for government intervention in legal proceedings involving civil rights.

183

Citing the cases of Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) and Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) respectively; quotation from Mary
L. Dudziak, ‘Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative’ Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (November, 1988), Page 105
184
Philip Elman interviewed by Norman Silber for the Columbia Oral History Project, ‘The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History’ (1987) Harvard Law Review, Volume 100, No. 4 (February, 1987), Pages 817-18
185
Philip Elman interviewed by Norman Silber for the Columbia Oral History Project, ‘The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History’ (1987) Harvard Law Review, Volume 100, No. 4 (February, 1987), Page 818
186
There was no civil rights division in the Department of Justice at that time. In his oral history Elman called himself the “civil rights man in the
Solicitor General’s office” (818), which is why he was so heavily involved in the case.

65

Shelley v. Kraemer was a private arbitration about a ‘restrictive covenant’ that had been
written into a property contract in 1911 in St. Louis, Missouri, stating that for the next fifty years
the property owners could not sell or rent to “people of the Negro or Mongolian race.”187 Racial
restrictive covenants became popular in the United States after the Supreme Court decision in
Buchanan v. Warley in 1917, which ruled that city zoning laws, an official endorsement of
segregation, were unconstitutional.188Buchanan v. Warley did not prevent individuals writing their
racial prejudices into property agreements because restrictive covenants were private
arrangements otherwise unhindered by the law. As such, though state-sanctioned housing
segregation had been abolished, white populations had a legal loophole to maintain racial
separation, a covenant that held up in local courts. In 1948, Shelley v. Kraemer, however, disputed
the legitimacy of these covenants at the Supreme Court level, forcing a branch of the federal
government to either officially endorse segregation measures it had thus far tacitly accepted, or to
reject racial restrictive covenants as unconstitutional, paving the way for broader challenges
against segregation. According to Solicitor General Philip Perlman, the brief filed in Shelley v.
Kraemer in 1948 was “the first instance in which the Government had intervened in a case to
which it was not a party and in which its sole purpose was the vindication of rights guaranteed by
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.”189 The decision to involve the Department of Justice
in this legal proceeding on the side of the plaintiff, not only established the government’s position
on civil rights, but it also had positive symbolic value for Truman on the global stage.
In his 1987 interview, Elman suggested that President Truman and Attorney General Tom
C. Clark’s decision to approve the first amicus curiae brief in Shelley v. Kraemer was the result of
an electoral strategy aimed at gaining Northern black votes. His interpretation, however, ignores
187
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both domestic tensions over civil rights and the overwhelming foreign criticism the U.S. had
endured over its racial practices. It ought to be noted further that Elman follows this conjecture in
his oral history interview with legal history scholar Norman Silber by stating, “Well, I don’t know
exactly what happened.”190 By the time of his interview, Elman knew retrospectively how vital
Northern black voters had been to Truman’s success; however, this reality does not imply an
equivalent presidential motive.191 Democrats were so divided over civil rights in the year leading
up to the election that the president actively resisted taking a stand on the issue for fear of losing
his Southern white base. Indeed, when members of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)
pushed a more powerful civil rights plank during the Democratic national convention in July
1948, Truman called the plank a “crackpot amendment”192 because it antagonised large sections
of the party without substantial benefits. However, when ADA’s version of the plank passed and
Southern Democrats walked out of the convention to run their own presidential candidate,
Truman had no choice but to take the black vote more seriously. This point of transition, however,
came some seven months after the president approved the Justice Department’s brief in Shelley v.
Kraemer. Until forced to court the black electorate in July 1948, the immense international
pressure he faced to bring American policy in to line with its rhetoric more plausibly motivated
Truman’s actions. Moreover, as Mary L. Dudziak notes in her study of the period, “The image of
a well-meaning President struggling against a recalcitrant Congress might help Truman at the
polls in the United States, but not in the United Nations. Some actual change in American racial
policies was needed to silence foreign critics.”193 Truman’s rhetoric on civil rights, Dudziak
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suggests, would have been enough to placate domestic reform activists because they did not
expect (or did not seek) dramatic change.194 The president’s decision to pursue substantive
reform, therefore, reflected the international scope of the American dilemma.
The Justice Department’s brief in Shelley v. Kraemer highlighted the consequences of
enforcing racial restrictive covenants on the U.S.’s position in an international arena already
critical of the country’s civil rights history. The Department of Justice quoted at length from
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s May 1946 letter to the Fair Employment Practices
Commission,195 which argued that domestic desegregation and civil rights reform were integral to
the nation’s interests abroad. The brief also cited a letter from the Under Secretary of the Interior,
Oscar L. Chapman, who, in his discussion of domestic minorities (which generally focused on
Indian affairs), echoed Acheson’s concerns. “The broad implications of restrictive covenants,”
Chapman had said, “are entirely inconsistent with the future national and international welfare of
the United States in its relations with the ‘non-white’ peoples.”196 The concern these two
important officials had over the moral well-being of the United States within an increasingly nonwhite global arena echoes the thousands of State Department memos from U.S. embassy officials
noting the damage domestic race relations had on the country’s image abroad. The international
repercussions of Shelley v. Kraemer, therefore, made the Supreme Court’s decision a federal
concern, and as such some of the best legal minds in the country collaborated to find a solution
that would protect the moral legitimacy of the country without domestic creating a backlash
among Southern whites supremacists.
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To the Justice Department, a Supreme Court decision that ruled racial restrictive
covenants as legally enforceable violated the principle of democracy, since it lent a federal hand
to segregation practices. The Department of Justice argued that “judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants constituted governmental action in violation of rights protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States;”197 thus, segregated housing was contrary to the basic
principles of American democracy. The brief commented at length on the implications these
covenants had on individual freedoms, stating:
[Racial restrictive covenants] are responsible for the creation of isolated areas in which overcrowded racial minorities are confined, and in which living conditions are steadily worsened. The
avenues of escape are being narrowed and reduced. As the people so trapped, there is no life in the
accepted sense of the word; liberty is a mockery, and the right to pursue happiness a phrase without
meaning, empty of hope and reality. This situation cannot be reconciled with the spirit of mutual
tolerance and respect for the dignity and rights of the individual which give vitality to our
democratic way of life. The time has come to destroy these evils which threaten the safety of our
198
free institutions.

The language of this quotation exhibits the strength with which the Justice Department demanded
substantive change from the Supreme Court. The allusion to the vitality of democracy indicates
the level of federal awareness over the country’s moral legitimacy amid Cold War animosities,
suggesting the symbolic repercussions of the decision were as significant to the government as de
facto change.
The government displayed its awareness of the potential damage dramatic reform could
have on domestic politics, suggested that the Supreme Court could refuse to enforce racial
restrictive covenants without actually finding them ‘unconstitutional.’ The brief noted that the
federal government had committed itself to public policy objectives—in statutes, executive
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pronouncements, and international agreements—that promised “to deny the sanction of law to
racial discrimination, and to ensure equality under the law to all persons, irrespective of race,
creed, or color.”199 The Justice Department argued that as a branch of the federal government, the
Supreme Court was bound by public policy, and therefore could not enforce racial restrictive
covenants because such action would sanction discrimination within the law. As such, the Justice
Department offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to condemn segregation without
addressing it as a constitutional question, which undoubtedly would have alienated white
supremacists.
In its decision on May 3rd 1948, the Supreme Court did not rule racial restrictive
covenants unconstitutional, and therefore it did not prevent buyers and sellers from making such
agreements privately. However, the Court did note that state or federal enforcement of such
covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, making enforcement of
these covenants unconstitutional, though the covenants themselves were not. This decision did not
challenge the constitutionality of segregation policies, nor did it substantially alter the civil rights
status of minority populations; however, the federal government condemned race discrimination
as un-American and removed the veil of legality such practices had earlier enjoyed. In 1987,
Philip Elman reflected that the government’s argument in Shelley v. Kraemer was “not an
ordinary brief. It was a statement of national policy,” he claimed. “We were showing the flag; we
were expressing an authoritative, forthright position that all government officials would be bound
by."200 Whether or not the Department of Justice’s amicus curiae brief substantially aided the
Supreme Court’s decision, “the department’s actions were an important precedent in the legal
199

‘Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae’ (December 1947) submitted by Attorney General Clark, Solicitor General Perlman, and the
Department of Justice for consideration Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), Pages 93-4. As reproduced in Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard
Casper (ed.), Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, Volume 46: Shelley v. Kraemer
(1948), Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Wolf v. Colorado (1949) (Arlington, Virginia: University Publications of American, Inc.; 1975),
Pages 325-6.
200
Philip Elman interviewed by Norman Silber for the Columbia Oral History Project, ‘The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History’ (1987) Harvard Law Review, Volume 100, No. 4 (February, 1987), Page 819

70

battle against discrimination in American life.”201 In Shelley v. Kraemer the federal government
committed itself to defending minority rights in legal proceedings, and the Supreme Court
suggested that over time it would to start examining discrimination as a constitutional question.

Making Civil Rights a Presidential Plank
At the Democratic national convention in Philadelphia in July 1948, Party liberals
challenged Truman’s hope of maintaining a moderate line on civil rights in his presidential
campaign. Prior this point, Truman had taken action to promote civil rights in response to foreign
pressures, but domestic disunity had led him to adopt a weak civil rights platform in an attempt to
placate Southern Democrats. Party liberals, however, “were angry over the Administration’s
refusal to endorse a strong plank on civil rights and they were determined to write one into the
party platform even if it necessitated a fight on the floor.”202 Hubert Humphrey, the mayor of
Minneapolis, gave a speech at the convention rallying support for this stronger party line on civil
rights by noting the implications domestic inequality had for the country’s moral legitimacy in the
global arena. Speaking powerfully from a podium, Humphrey declared:
This is far more than a Party matter. Every citizen in this country has a stake in the emergence of
the United States as a leader in the free world. That world is being challenged by the world of
slavery. For us to play our part effectively, we must be in a morally sound position.203

Humphrey, like Truman, described the international implications of the “Negro problem” in an
attempt to persuade those members of his audience that might otherwise oppose civil rights.
Humphrey’s attempt to appeal to a broader audience, however, was unsuccessful. Following
Humphrey’s speech, large segments of Democratic Southerners walked out of the convention,
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uniting under South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, a staunch segregationist and third-party
candidate in the 1948 election
Though Truman resented the damage Humphrey’s speech had done to party unity, it
would be a stretch to say this drastically altered his course of action, given that he had already
prepared the two executive orders to desegregate the armed forces and prohibit race
discrimination in the civil service. William C. Berman notes in ‘Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,’
that “Once the campaign was on, it was essential for President Truman to give further evidence of
his sincerity and good will on the civil rights question.”204 Party tensions prior to Humphrey’s
speech had, to some extent, impeded Truman. Though the made several speeches on civil rights,
and approved the Justice Department’s amicus curiae brief in Shelley v. Kraemer, he had not yet
taken decisive presidential action to assert his position on the issue. White House memos from as
early as January 1948 suggest the president was prepared to desegregate the military by executive
order; however, “it was not until the delegates at the 1948 Democratic National Convention called
for a liberal civil rights plank that included desegregation of the armed forces that Truman felt
comfortable enough”205 to issue that order. The plank adopted by the DNC gave Truman the
opportunity to prove to the international community, and those members of the national
community in support of civil rights, that as president of the Untied States he was capable of
implementing change reflective of his rhetorical line. Though party divisions in July 1948
damaged Truman’s chances to win in Southern states, it gave him the opportunity to take sides in
a domestic struggle, signifying to the world that he was a man of his word. “Analysts have
suggested,” presidential scholar Ronald Sylvia notes, “that Truman’s decision was rewarded by
the delivery by civil rights groups of overwhelming numbers of black voters in key states that off204
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set Southern losses.”206 Truman’s actions may have been inspired by personal convictions, but
they were also inhibited by personal prejudices, and reflected the calculated and decisive nature of
an introspective and intelligent mind. The president’s decision to desegregate the military, though
not fully implemented until 1950 (and then due to realpolitik pressures,) showed that Truman was
prepared to continue nurturing the growth of democracy at home. Needless to say, though some
foreign news agencies commended the president’s actions (just as they would when he submitted
his Civil Rights Bill to Congress in 1949, though it never passed), critics of American democracy
recognised change in the United States primarily as something achieved by “progressive”
fractions, and not by the president and his administration.207
In 1949, a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow, Foy Kohler, noted, “this attention to the
Negro problem serves political ends desired by the Soviet Union and has nothing whatsoever to
do with any desire to better the Negro position.”208 Kohler went on to note that though the Soviet
press had mentioned the renowned black statesman Ralph Bunche several times over the previous
year, it had never identified his race. Indeed, the first time the Soviet press recognised Bunche as
a ‘Negro’ politician, according to Kohler, was in an article entitled 'Washington--An Unsuitable
Place for a Negro,' which explained that Bunche had refused the position of assistant secretary of
state, because it would have required him to move to Washington, DC, a city with staunch
segregation laws. In short, the Soviet press ignored Bunche’s racial identity except when it could
be used to embarrass the White House. Bunche’s role in American political life represented
progress to an administration taking steps to improve domestic civil rights, an improvement that
went practically unreported in the Soviet media. In its attempt to paint U.S. democracy as
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fundamentally exploitative, the Kremlin “seize[d] upon anything showing the position of the U.S.
Negro in a derogatory light while ignoring entirely the genuine progress being made in America
in improving the situation."209 By 1949, the U.S. State Department called the “Negro question”
"One of the principal Soviet propaganda themes regarding the United States,”210 and called for a
direct U.S. response to the “misinformation” Moscow disseminated both within and outside its
borders.
In January 1952, Eleanor Roosevelt also expressed concern over the extensive news
coverage of U.S. domestic race relations in the French press. During her visit to Paris as part of
the United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, she wrote home to
then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Mrs. Roosevelt said:
I think this is perhaps one of the things that militates against us more than anything else. I do
believe something really energetic should be done to bring the countries of Europe and Asia up-todate on the situation of the Negro in the United States. It is almost the best U.S.S.R. Soviet (sic)
211
propaganda as far as its affect upon the nations that should be our friends.

A lifelong political activist, Eleanor Roosevelt was a respected spokesperson for civil rights.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s reply exhibits the energy with which the Department of State
was trying to counter the damage that domestic racial practices were having on foreign relations.
It is our belief that simple truth about the place of the Negro in America is our most effective
weapon in meeting this problem… In the field of press and publications, a sizable package of
background materials has been sent to eighty-five of our overseas missions. The chief merit of this
‘kit,’ designed for adaptation to the special needs of the various areas of the world, lies in the fact
that it is the answer of American Negroes themselves to allegations made by those either ignorant
212
or uninterested in the true situations.

The United States disseminated information about the “Negro Problem” in countries particularly
sensitive to racial discrimination in an attempt to counter the misinformation spread by
communist and anti-American groups. Though the Department of State could not independently
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enforce domestic change in the United States, by incorporating the views of African Americans
into their propaganda campaign they gave a largely silenced group a political voice in the
international community, albeit a strongly vetted voice.
As international criticism of the U.S. “Negro problem” continued to hamper the
Department of State’s ability to affect U.S. foreign policy, the federal government began actively
countering anti-American propaganda with its own psychological warfare campaign.213
Meanwhile, Truman’s administration continued to engage with civil rights in the judiciary system
by filing a number of amicus curiae briefs similar to that in Shelley v. Kraemer. The president
himself presented a Civil Rights Bill to Congress in 1949, which was immediately shot down by
the domestically-focused legislative body; however, Truman continued to seek ways to redress
race discrimination, and the issue remained a perennial theme in his political rhetoric at home and
abroad. No single act in the second half of Truman’s presidency was more significant for the civil
rights movement, however, than the Justice Department’s decision to file its final and most
compelling amicus curiae brief in the landmark segregation case of Brown v. Board of Education.

Separate As Constitutionally Unequal
In its 1952 the amicus curiae brief in Brown v. Board of Education, the Department of
Justice defended federal intervention in state policy on the grounds that international cold war
pressure had morphed a social issue into a threat to national security. The foreign press’s
preoccupation with American segregation, the government argued, damaged the country’s ability
to form alliances essential for defence in a polarised political arena. As such, the Justice
Department supported the NAACP’s challenge of the precedent set by the 1896 Supreme Court
213
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decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, which had sanctioned state-sponsored ‘separate but equal’
segregation. The ‘separate but equal’ doctrine had served as scaffolding for racial segregation
policies in affect throughout the South; despite a number of attempts to overrule it, the Supreme
Court had never questioned the constitutionality of the decision. In the 1950 case of Sweatt v.
Painter, the Court had skirted the issue, ruling that as a law school set up for black students in
Texas was fundamentally unequal to its white-only equivalent, it did not meet the requirements of
‘separate but equal.’ In Sweatt, the Court required an all-white institution to admit several black
students until Texas had improved its black law school. Though the Supreme Court was not
prepared to decide the constitutionality of segregation in this case, the ruling suggested to leading
NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall that the Supreme Court could be convinced to explore the
issue if he could prove that separate schools were never equal. Subsequently, African American
families in several states and the District of Columbia began to file lawsuits that in 1954 would be
ruled on collectively under the leading title of Brown v. Board of Education.
The Department of State outlined how the interests of the United States were implicated in
the Court’s decision. Abridge here, this argument is one of the most compelling pieces of
evidence that reveal the federal government’s awareness of how domestic discrimination was
destroying the country’s reputation abroad:
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the
problem of racial discrimination must be viewed. The United States is trying to prove to the people
of the world, of every nationality, race, and color, that a free democracy is the most civilized and
most secure form of government devised by man. We must set an example for others by showing
determination to remove existing flaws in our democracy.
During the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations attributable to this source has
become progressively greater…the undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives unfriendly
governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their propaganda warfare. The hostile
reaction among normally friendly peoples, many of whom are particularly sensitive in regard the
status of non-European races, is growing in alarming proportions…The sincerity of the United
States in this respect will be judged by its deeds as well as its words…Although progress is being
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made, the continuance of racial discrimination in the United States…jeopardizes the effective
214
maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world.

The clarity with which the Department of Justice identified and explained the international scope
of the “Negro problem” is striking, not least because it indicates the tenacity with which the
government had begun to fight for its moral legitimacy in the global arena.215
As in the Shelley v. Kraemer, in the amicus curiae brief for Brown v. Board of Education
the Justice Department offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to clearly state the
government’s position without creating a major backlash among white segregationists. The brief
noted that the Court only had to make a decision on the constitutionality of the ‘separate but
equal’ doctrine if, and only if “it were found as a fact, upon the basis of supporting evidence, that
the separate schools are equal in the education (sic) benefits and opportunities afforded children
of both races.”216 As such, the Department of Justice argued that the Supreme Court could make a
ruling in Brown similar to the one it had submitted in Sweatt in 1950, but only if “separate schools
are found physically unequal.”217
If, however, segregated schools had already levelled the playing fields across the colour
line, the Department of Justice demanded that the Supreme Court address question of “whether
‘equalization’ is the same as equality.”218 In this instance, the brief argued, in-keeping with the
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evidence already submitted by the NAACP,219 which noted that “Segregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children,” and that
“The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.”220 Moreover, the Department
of Justice cited numerous Supreme Court decisions,221 stating, “The Government submits that
compulsory racial segregation is itself, without more, an unconstitutional discrimination.”222 As
such, the government argued that if the Supreme Court felt impelled to question the
constitutionality of the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine, it would have to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,
and call the doctrine ‘unconstitutional.’ “Separate but equal,” the Justice Department declared, “is
a contradiction in terms.”223
Quoting from a decision in the 1917 case Gompers v. United States, the Justice
Department noted that though Plessy had long-since been accepted in the American legal system,
“The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their
form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their significance is
vital, not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by
considering their origin and the line of their growth.”224 This eloquent defence of revisionist legal
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practices suggested that a Supreme Court ruling against the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine could
propel the state further towards its democratic ideals. Recognising the tenacity with which many
Southern states clung to segregation, however, the brief suggested gradual reform, or
desegregation with “deliberate speed.” When asked about the brief filed in Brown v. Board of
Education, Elman answered, “The reason I’m proud of that proposal is that it offered the Court a
way out of its dilemma, a way to end racial segregation without inviting massive disobedience, a
way to decide the constitutional issue unanimously without tearing the Court apart…We proposed
a middle ground, separating the constitutional principle from the remedy...”225 The middle ground
was an avenue the government hoped would relieve the international implications of the
American dilemma Myrdal had identified eight years previously, a way for the court to find
segregation unconstitutional once and for all. The brief filed by Truman’s Justice Department in
Brown v. Board of Education was the last significant step made by an administration under
immense foreign pressure to align its domestic policy with its idealistic rhetoric and convictions,
but among the first in the broader movement to make civil rights “living realities, not literary
abstractions.”226
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Epilogue
During Truman’s presidency, Cold War tensions brought questions of moral legitimacy to
the forefront of the national agenda. As such, foreign criticism of U.S. domestic racial practices,
particularly in light of the country’s rhetorical commitment to freedom and equality, threatened
the country’s reputation on the world stage. Influential members of the Truman administration
(the president himself, Acheson, Clark, and even Marshall), tacitly supported legal and economic
desegregation (though perhaps not social), and responded to foreign criticisms by incorporating
civil rights reform into the national agenda. At a time of intense domestic disagreement over
segregation, the federal government emerged as the leading actor on social reform, suggesting the
extent to which the movement was impelled by external factors. Although most of the steps taken
towards civil rights during the Truman presidency were more symbolic than substantive, the
administration initiated a federal engagement with race discrimination that would continue
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In summary, individual actors and global
processes combined during the Truman presidency to instigate a crucial change within the federal
government, and, subsequently, within the fabric of American democracy.
This study focuses the majority of its attention on federal action and foreign criticism
related to civil rights, and sometimes it does so at the expense of recognising the efforts of
domestic activists. Given the limited voice of U.S. minorities in political discussions, federal
policy reform was invariably a product of national interest viewed through the white American
lens. In the Cold War context, this lens was narrowed further in accordance with the state’s
determination to contain communism. At times, domestic civil rights advocates successfully
incorporated into these geo-political tensions (such as when the NNC, NAACP and CRC
petitioned the United Nations over human rights violations occurring in the United States), but for
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the most part their activity was on the local and state level. This is not to overlook the power civil
rights groups had when they threatened to march on Washington, DC, but rather to note that such
activity would not become common or truly effective for several more years. This study in no
way seeks to disregard the achievements of domestic civil rights activists, quite the opposite. The
ability of the black press to keep U.S. race discrimination within sight of foreign critics marks the
tenacity with which individual actors sought social reform. Moreover, this tenacity over
subsequent years would highlight the hypocrisy of race discrimination in the eyes of white
Americans as well as foreigners, and by 1964 created a domestic climate in which congressional
enactment of the PCCR’s recommendations would be realised.
This study sought to internationalise an issue typically viewed through a domestic lens,
exposing federal engagement with civil rights reform as a product of the rapidly globalising postWorld War II arena. Without resorting to counterfactuals, it seems clear the progress made during
Truman’s presidency towards civil rights could not have been achieved without the dynamic
shifts in national legitimacy that resulted from collective security efforts such as the United
Nations, if only because domestic reform was orchestrated almost entirely at the federal level.
Though many members of the U.N. still have a grisly record with regards to human rights, the
accountability international condemnation brings to bear on those states continues to produce
internal reform in nations hoping to increase their moral legitimacy in the international arena. The
Cold War may have ended, therefore, but it left a legacy of competition for moral legitimacy that
suggests a gradual global shift towards the practical fulfilment of the democratic ideal.
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